XLVI

ENGLANDS APPEAL FROM THE Private Cabal AT WHITE-HALL TO The Great Council of the Nation, THE LORDS and COMMONS IN Parliament ASSEMBLED.

By a true Lover of his Countrey. Sr Will. Coventry, as ye common report went.

Anno. 1673.

Nunquam eſt fidelis cum potente ſocietas.
Teſtatur hæc fabula Propoſitum meum.

VAcca & Capella & patiens Ovis injurice,
Socij fuere cum Leone in ſaltibus.
Hi cum cepiſſent Cervum vaſti corporis,
Sic eſt locutus, partibus factis, Leo.
Ego primam tollo, nominor quia Leo:
Secundam, quia ſum fortis tribuetis mihi.
Tum quia plus valeo, me ſequetur tertia,
Malo adficietur, ſi quis quartam tetigerit.
Sic totam prædam Sola Improbitas abſtulit.

Anglice,

ENgland this fable plainly Shew's,
A ſtrong Allie no Partner know's.

THe BULL the GOAT, and Patient SHEEP one day,
Leagu'd with the LYON, ſought a Common prey;
A Prey they took, an high and mighty Hart;
Of which each thought to have his equal part:
Soft, quoth the LYON, I the firſt ſhare claim,
'Cauſe LYON King'th, For eſt is my name;
The ſecond you ſhall give me as my due,
'Cauſe I am valiant, able to ſubdue:
The third I take by force, and for the reſt,
Touch it who dares; yield it all, you had beſt.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

THis is an Age of Wonders: And if with a cosidering eye we take a careful view of *Europe*, we shall find that some years last past have presented us with as many things worthy of admiration as any former age hath afforded to our forefathers. The Revolution of *Portugal*, and the wonderful secrecy with which it was carried on, is not to be matched in any Age. The Tragy-Comedy of *Massanello* looks more like a Poetical fiction then a real truth. The Deposing of Kings, and (which is much more strange) their Voluntary resignation (of which the Annals of Antient times furnish us, but with very few Examples) are become the common Theam of our Journals, and if from the rest of *Europe* we turn our eyes toward this Island, our surprisal will increase, and we shall find that this little British World is a small Enchiridion or Epitome of all the stupendious events that ever hapned in the great one. We have all seen or had a share in those passages which Posterity will hardly give more credit to, then we do to what is said of King *Arthurs* Round Table. And 'tis not improbable that some hundred years hence the History of our late Revolutions will be ranked among the fabulous Romances of *Gildas*, and such other Writers.

But it may be among all our unexpected changes, revolutions and Counsels, there is scarce any more justly to be wond ed at, then the present Alliance with *France*, and the war we have undertaken, and do still persist to prosecute against *Holland*, in so dangerous an association with the *French*. It was undoubtedly above the reach of an ordinary understanding to imagine or suspect (in the least) that a Protestant Kingdom, without being compelled to it by some urgent and unavoidable necessity, should ever fight with so much fierceness for the destruction of the Protestant interest: or that *English* Counsellors should advise hi, Majesty to run the fortune of a *French* King without a rational prospect of advantage to himself. Would any man that judgeth of things

things according to the ordinary rules of prudence, have thought that in order to the making good our Title to the Kingdom of *France*, we ſhould able their preſent King to invade all Chriſtendom, & to extend his Empire without bounds, or that to ſecure to our ſelves the ſoveraignty of the Seas, we ſhould with ſo much induſtery endeavour to force all the *Dutch Ships*, with all their Naval Power into the *French* Arms, and rejoyce at their Victories, as if by conquering the Land, they did not Maſter at the ſame time their Havens, their Rivers, and their Fleets. We have been often told of briſk meſſengers ſent formerly to the *French* Kings, as ſoon as the did but lay the Carkaſe of ſome pitiful Ship upon the ſtocks. But we did never ſo much as dream of that Vice Admirals, and other conſiderable Sea Officers ſhould be ſent to the *French* Court to encourage and promote the ſetting out of their Fleets: That pitying their want of experiance in Sea Affairs we would out of Compaſſionate and Brotherly love lead their raw Sea-men by the hand, Train them up in our Fleets, and amongſt the beſt of our Sea-men, teach them what Skill we have learnt in a long and dear bought experience. And to Crown all, even fight for them, and interpoſe between them and danger with ſo good ſucceſs (as it proved) that the *French* Squadron (as if the engagement had been only deſigned for an entertainment and diverſion to them) came off as freſh and as whole as when they firſt ſailed out of their Ports. The ſurpriſing novelty and ſtrangeneſs of theſe unexpected Councils hath occaſioned the following reflections. And all men being equally concerned in the preſervation of the Ship they ſail in, though all do not ſit at the Helm, it is every ones duty as well as their undoubted right to prevent as much as they are able, a fatal running upon Rocks, which may chance not to be diſcerned by others, upon this juſt and well grounded confidence, I preſume to direct theſe papers to the real Counſel of the Nation, humbly begging that they be read with an unbyaſſed mind, and truth weighed in the balance of the Sanctuary. Before I muſt premiſe I do not intend to write an Apology for the *French*, nor to juſtifie all their proceedings, much leſs to encounter the number of the ſcurrilos Pamphlets againſt them, which I am confident will affect no ſober man in the Nation, and need only to be read to be confuted. I'le only ſay that ſince all Chriſtians ſhould above all things enquire into juſtice of their Armes before they either take them up, or refuſe to lay them down. It will become the wiſdom and prudence of both houſes to hear what the *Dutch*

may

may say for themselves, and to take into their serious consideration the protestations they make both in publick and private, of their unfeigned desires as well as readiness to give *England* all possible satisfaction, and buy His Majesties Friendship at a more then ordinary rate.

But my present design being not to enter further into these particulars, nor to examine the Justice or Injustice of this War, but rather to consider and quære (supposing it had been never so just at first) how far it may be advisable to continue it, I will with as much clearness as I am able, and in as few words as the matter will bear, confine my self to these following Heads.

1. *A short account of the Crown with which His Majesty is entered into League.*
2. *The necessity and unavoidable consequents of this War.*
3. *Some general reflexions upon the whole,* with some account *of the manner and steps by which this War was both promoted and begun.*

1. All those who are not altogether strangers to the world will easily grant, that of all the Kingdoms of *Europe* there are none but may be said inferior to *France* in some respect or other, and to want some advantages which *France* enjoyeth in a very eminent degree. The greatness of its Territories, the populousness of it, the number of their Gentry and Nobility, their natural courage, together with the advantage of being trained up either to Military actions or to Warlike exercises, ever since the foundation of their Monarchy; the situation of their Country, and the opportunities they have by it to annoy their Neighbours upon all occasions; the fruitfulness and riches of the Soil, together with the prodigious quantity of all sorts of Commodities manufactured and unmanufactured, with which they supply their Neighbours; and lastly, the great Revenues of their Kings, who governing of late without controll or check, are so much the more able to oppress their Neighbours. All these advantages meeting together, they have in all Ages had aspiring thoughts, and under *Charlemain* had erected a new Western Empire, which in all likelihood would have proved of longer continuation, had not those great Dominions been shared and divided between the said *Charlemains* Children, which in the succeeding Ages proved an occasion of many great and bloudy Wars.

2. A second memorable stop to the encrease of the *French* was, when by the ambition of *Hugh Capite*, who aimed at the Crown, to usurp it with less opposition, and to draw the Grandees into his party, he made all their Governments Hereditary, and erected them into a kind of Principalities held *in Capite*, from thence sprang so many great Families, able afterwards to wage war against the *French King*. And whilest they were thus in a kind of Minority, the House of *Burgundy* having joyned with *England*, brought that Kingdom to the low condition every one knows.

Lewis the XI. was the first who (after the *English* had lost not onely their new Conquest, but also what they had possessed of old *France*, raised the *French* Crown a greater height, and his Son *Charles* the VIII. besides the acquisition of *Britany*, frighted all *Europe* by his surprising Conquest of the Kingdom of *Naples*.

This occasioned a general Confederacy of all neighbouring Princes against him, whereby he soon lost what he had gotten. But still the ambitious thoughts of his successors would have much endangered the liberty of *Europe*, if the *Austrian Family* (raised on a sudden to a vast Grandeur, the occasion of an innumerable number of Provinces united in *Charles* the V.) had not carried the Imperial Crown from *Francis* the I. who stood with much eagerness for it, and had already engaged several of the Electors.

This having overballanced the *French Power*, the said *Francis* the I. though helped several times by the Great *Solyman* Emperor of the *Turks*, was at last forced to yield to the Victorious arms of *Charles* the V. who took him prisoner, and forced him to buy his liberty with a very disadvantageous Peace.

But his Son *Henry* the II. had better success, and amongst other advantages he added to his Dominions three very fair Imperial and Episcopal Towns, and was likely to have gone further had he not been prevented by a sudden death, *England* all this while (true at that time to their own Interest) with a skilful hand holding the balance, and keeping the contesting parties in as great an equality as their own occasions would permit.

Under the minority of his Children the bloody Massacres and Civil Wars began, which lasted forty years, and would have put an end to that Monarchy if the ambition of *Philip* the II. would have given way to the dividing of it into the several Principalities which the respective Grandees aimed at.

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But *Henry* the 4th. strengthned by the divisions which grew between the *Spaniards* and the holy League, having won many Battels, made his Title to the Crown good, by the success of his Arms; shortly after concluded peace with *Spain* to gain time to breath, and to recover new strength.

No sooner was he at rest, but he bent all his thoughts upon a project as vast in the design of it, as Extraordinary in its nature, intending no less then to cast *Europe* into a new Mold, & to reduce all the Kingdoms and Common wealths that were in his time to a certain number, and to bring them within such bounds as he should prescribe to them, being sure however in this Marshalling to take such share to himself as would have enabled him (or at least his Successors) to grow into an universal Monarch.

To effect this he had already made choice of his Generals and other great Officers, and was preparing much Arms and money, when a sudden and unexpected death puts an end as well to his undertaking as to his life.

The beginning, and in troth the greatest part of the Reign of *Lewis* the 13th. his Son was much disquieted by intestine broils and Civil Wars, during which the house of *Austria* was very near bringing all *Germany* under their subjection, and after the Battel of *Prague* stood very fair for the universal Empire. But *France* having at last quieted all at home, did (under pretence of opposing the *Austrian* Family, and whilst they were courted by several Princes to assist and protect them against the Emperour) vastly increased their own power, and conquered new Provinces, and considerable Towns in *Spain*, *Italy*, *Germany*, and the *Low Countries*, which raising new jealousies in their own Allies occasioned the peace of *Munster* to prevent their further progress.

About the same time the new Civil wars, which broke out in *France* under the minority of the present King, gave opportunity to *Spain* to recover part of their Losses, till the (late) Protector of *England* joyning with the *French* (for the advancement of some private ends of his own; and by a policy from which the destruction of Europe may chance to take its date before we are much older) brought them into a decaying condition, and made the *Pyrenian* Peace (after the death of *Cromwel*) most welcome to them.

Before we go further and come to give a more particular account of

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the present *French* Court, I will beg leave to stop here a while, and desire the Reader to take along the following inferences, from what hath already been hinted, a more full knowledge thereof being left to the perusal of their Histories.

1. That no greater proofs can be given of the internal strength of the *French* Nation, then their overcoming the many dangerous convulsions of state, they have from time to time strugled with, which in all appearance would have destroyed any other Nation.

2. That in all Ages, assoon as their intestine troubles have been over, they have still out of a restless Warlike humor endeavoured to encroach upon their neighbours, and to encrease their own Dominions, laying hold of all opportunities to disturb mankind, and having never been able as yet to set bounds to their Ambition.

3. That this Ambitious humor of theirs, supported by the greatness of their power would long before this time have brought all *Europe* under their Subjection, if their own division and private quarrels had not from time to time, put back their designs for many years, or their greatest Princes been cut off before they could finish their intended work.

4. And Lastly as a consequence of the three former, that it was ever, and will be still, the true interest of *Europe* to oppose the *French* designs, or if there be any occasion of making use of them against some other opposers, not to accept of their assistance, longer or further then publick utility requires it, nor to suffer them to proceed after the danger is over, as it was practiced in the peace of *Passaw*, in the time of *Henry* the 2. and that of *Munster*, in both which the *French* were stopped in their full carreer by their own Allies, though they still came off with profit.

The *French* having thus in the last Wars added many fair Provinces and Towns to their Territories, this present Court had no sooner made Peace with *Spain*, but they thought of laying the foundations of a vaster Empire than ever. And perceiving that since the discovery of the *Indies*, and increase of Trade, Naval strength was the most important of all others, and Navigation and commerce the greatest (if not the only) supporters of it. They first erected and encouraged several Trading Companies, and in the second place they spared no cost and stuck at no charge or expense, to purchase a considerable Fleet of men of War, wherein they have been so successful, that I fear their

Fleet (excepting the true courage of our Seamen) is not much inferiour to that of His Majesties, as incredible as it may seem at first, considering how few years they have applied themselves to it.

But whilest they were thus intent upon the increase of their Interest at Sea, they let no opportunity slip of enlarging their Empire at Land, for during the late war with *Holland* they invaded in 1667, and masted a considerable part of the *Spanish Low Countries*; in 1669 they hunted the poor Duke of *Lorrain* out of his Dutchy, and to this day possess it all; and now this last year they have conquered the half of the *United Provinces*. Muchless then all this was more then sufficient to awaken all *Europe*; and His Majesty above all others being out of his Princely wisdom very sensible, that the keeping a true ballance between the Princes and other States of *Europe*, was the onely security of all, and that by a timely stop to the *French* Conquests he would reap an infinite Honour and Profit. As soon as the *French* King fell upon *Flanders*, he began to think of applying fit remedies to so dangerous a disease; and having concluded a Peace at *Breda* with the *Hollanders*, he sent them in private in *Jan.* 1668. Sir *William Temple*, who was then his Resident at *Brussels*, to propose a nearer Alliance with them, and to take joynt measures against the *French*.

"No small argument by the way of His Majesties averseness to the "*French* Designs, and of the fear he had of their increase, since to pre"vent it he went so far as to seek the *Hollanders* first, and to propose "stricter Alliances with them, after so fierce and recent a war ended "with the unpleasant circumstances of *Chatham*.

Sir *William Temples* Propositals having been entertained with all ready compliance by the *Dutch*, he waited on His Majesty to give him an account of his Negotiation, and within five days after he was sent back to the *Hague*, with all necessary powers and instructions; by virtue of, and in conformity to which he concluded and agreed upon two several Treaties with the *Dutch*, the one a Defensive and stricter League then before between the two Nations; and the other a joynt and reciprocal Engagemant to oppose the Conquest of *Flanders*, and to procure either by way of Mediation, or by force of Arms, a speedy Peace between *France* and *Spain* upon the Terms therein mentioned; and because *Sweden* came unto the same Treaty very little after, from the three Parties con-

concerned and engaged, it was called the Triple League. In pursuance of this the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* was forced upon the *French*, and in some manner upon the *Spaniards*, who were ever unwilling to give away by a solemn Treaty so great a part of their Country. But both His Majesty and the *Hollanders* thought it a very great and good work, and judged it a great happiness not onely for *Spain*, but for all *Europe*, to come off with a Broken Pate, and to have at least for that while kept *France* from going further.

This represented to the Parliament with all the advantages of Language, and nothing omitted in the respective Speeches of His Majesty himself, the Lord Keeper, and many private Members that could make both Houses (and with them the whole Kingdom) sensible of the great Service done in *England*, and in a manner to all mankind, by chaining up a devouring Lion, who was never satiated with prey.

This Triple League grew so famous, that it proved the politick Institute of our *Infinite*. In the name of the Triple League, and of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, several Subsidies were both demanded and granted for 2 or 3 Sessions together: the Triple League stopped or annulled all Impeachments: for its sake Inquiries into miscarriages were laid aside; and the Parliament did conceive they could neither give nor forgive too much, if by their compliance they could but contribute somewhat towards binding the *French* to their good behaviour.

Besides this, to tie the Knot faster, and take even the very thoughts from the *French King* of ever stirring, or being troublesom to his Neighbours, His Majesty sent an Extraordinary Envoy to the several Princes of *Germany*, to invite them into a Triple League: His Minister to persuade them to it laying open with no less heat then plainness the danger all *Europe* was in, the insensibility of most Princes, and their carelessness, the watchful ambition of the *French*, the greatness of their Forces, and the little reason one had to trust them; in fine, omitting nothing that could alarm all the world, and procure a general Confederacy against the common Oppressor. Nay, to evince and demonstrate (besides all we know now) that this Triple League was not entered into out of a particular respect, or personal kindness to the *Spaniard*, (not to speak now of the Misunderstanding and Jarring between *England* and *Spain* in the *West Indies*) the *Spaniards* being very much wanting to themselves, by their backwardness in the payment of the Subsidies promised to *Sweden*. His Majesty not to be wanting to

Europe,

Europe, and consequently to his own Kingdoms, out of the deep sense he had of the necessity of preserving the Triple League entire, and being not without fears the *Swedes* might fall off, unless the mony agreed upon was paid them without further delay, he offered in *Sept.* or *Octob.* 1668, to advance himself part of it, and had accordingly done it in case the *Dutch* would have advanced the rest.

All this doth abundantly shew what opinion His Majesty and his Council were used to have of *France* as well as both Houses, and the rest of the Nation: and therefore without considering how things came to be altered (which we may take hereafter some notice of) we may lay down as an undeniable *English* Principle, and a Maxim never to be swerved from, That *France* is no ways to be suffered to grow Great, much less to have their designs promoted, as it is plain to all mankind they are now.

But we must go somewhat further, and there being nothing more dangerous then to joyn in any ambitious design with a Prince against whom we can no ways secure our selves in case he break his word to us, it will not be amiss to consider how far one may rely upon the candour and integrity of the *French Court*, and what may rationally be expected from their Generosity.

In order to this, since the heart of man is not known otherwise then by a careful observation of their actions, and that we cannot judge of things to come, but by Inferences and Arguments drawn from those that are past: the best way to satisfie our selves is to take a short survey of the carriage and conduct of the *French Court* for the last 13 Years, during which they have had still the same Ministers, who are not like to act thenceforth upon any other principles, or by other methods then they have done hitherto; and they having been brought up in so good a School as that of *Cardinal Mazarine*, (whose Motto was, *That an honest man ought not to be a slave to his word*) it must not be wondered at if they do still as much as they are able influence their present Master, and endeavour to perswade him that,

Si violandum est Jus, Regnandi causa violandum est.

The first proof of the honesty both of the *Cardinal* himself, and of his *Disciples*, in their carriage in the *Pyrenean* Treaty, and their performance of what was most essential in it, wherein is to be observed that by the endeavours of the *Queen-mother* of *France*, a Peace being promoted between the two Crowns with a Marriage between the

French

French King and *Infanta* of *Spain*, the whole Treaty was grounded upon two considerable points, which till granted by *France* had still hindered the conclusion of that great work; the one was the forsaking of *Portugal*, and the other a renuntiation of the *Infanta* (consented and ratified by the *French King*) of all her present and future Pretences, Titles, or Claims whatsoever to the *Spanish Monarchy* and *Dominions* thereof, or to any part of the same: "Left (saith the Treaty) the glory of their respective Kingdoms should come to decay and be diminished, if by reason and through the said Marriage they came to be "united and joyned in any of their Children and Posterity, which would "occasion to the Subjects and Vassals such troubles and afflictions as "might easily be imagined.

As to the first, (*viz.* the exclusion and forsaking of *Portugal*) the words of the Treaty are these: "His said Majesty (the *French King*) "will intermeddle no further in the said business, and doth promise "and oblige himself upon his honour, and upon the faith and word of "a King, both for himself and his Successors, not to give neither in com-"mon, nor to any person or persons thereof in particular, of what "Dignity, Estate, or Condition soever, either at present or for the fu-"ture, any help or assistance, neither publick nor secret, directly nor "indirectly, of Men, Arms, Munitions, Victualling, Vessels, nor Mony, "under any pretence, nor any other thing whatsoever, by Land or by "Sea, nor in any other manner, as likewise not to suffer any Levies to be "made in any part of his Kingdoms and Dominions, nor to grant a "passage to any that might come from other Countries to the relief "of the said Kingdom of *Portugal*.

I suppose all the world will grant, it were hard for the wit of man to find out, or so much as imagine stronger words, or fuller expressions in a Treaty, to prevent what the *Spaniards* were so much afraid of, *viz.* the assistance of *Portugal*; let us now see how it was performed.

As soon as this was agreed on, and before the Treaty was signed, Cardinal *Mazarine* (still resolved as well in this as upon all other occasions, not to be *Esclave de sa parol*) sent privately the Marquess of *Chenes* into *Portugal*, to assure them, that in order to the conclusion of the Treaty then on foot with *Spain*, they were forced to leave them out, and to engage not to assist them: but that whatever they promised they would never forsake them, and would still

ſtill protect them againſt *Spain* as much as they had done before. The truth is, they kept their word to *Portugal* much better then they did to *Spain*. And the Peace was no ſooner made, but they ſent them the uſual ſupplies of Men, Arms and Money. And a while after notwithſtanding their former Treaty with *Spain*, and in the view of the whole world, they entred into an Offenſive League with that Kingdom againſt all their Enemies, whereby, amongſt other things, the *French* were to have all the Sea-Towns that ſhould be taken from *Spain* delivered to them. All which with many other particulars, too long to be inſerted in this ſhort diſcourſe, may be ſeen more at large, in the incomparable Books of the *Baron de Aſſola*, intituled, the Buckler of State and Juſtice, which to this day could not be anſwered by the *French* though often challenged (and ſo much concerned in honor) to do it.

The other ſecurity of the *Pyrenean* Treaty as to *Spain*, and that without which they could never have given their conſent to their Marriage of the *Infanta*, was the Renunciation before mentioned. And whoever read it will be apt to think, a General Council of the *Civilians* was called, to outdo all former Expreſſions uſed in ſuch contracts, and to find out new binding Clauſes, to take of all poſſibility of Evaſion. And to make it more ſacred yet and more inviolable. There being no greater tie upon Soveraign Princes then that of Publique and ſolemn Treaties, the Act of the Renunciation was incorporated into the very Treaty of Peace, to make up of both of them but one body; though digeſted into different Inſtruments, as is expreſly declared in the 33. Article of the Treaty of Peace; wherein ſpeaking of the Contract of Marriage, to which they refer themſelves, theſe words are added, which though it be ſeperated hath the ſame force and vigour with the preſent Treaty of Peace, as being the principal part thereof, and the moſt precious pawn of its greater ſecurity and laſting.

But the *French Lawyers* preferring the little quirks of Law before publique faith, and pretending they might bring the Authority of ſolemn Treaties (which are the true, and indeed the only Law between Soveraign Princes) under the Cavil of *Municipal Laws* and Local Cuſtoms, endeavouring to perſwade the World that their Maſter was not bound to ſtand to what he had ſo ſolemnly promiſed and confirmed by ſacred Oaths: And the *French* King after the death of the late King of *Spain*, claimed (notwithſtanding the ſaid Renunciation)

nunciation) a great part of the *Spaniſh Low-Countries*, as being devolved to him in right of his Wife, by the *Municipal Laws* of thoſe Countries; And to back his unexpected Claim with more effectual means, he invaded the Countrey with a powerful Army.

This Invaſion, ſo contrary to his Engagements, and ſo deſtructive to the very eſſence of the *Pyrenean Treaty*, was attended with ſome circumſtances no leſs ſurpriſing than the breach it ſelf.

The one was that paſſed at *Paris* between the *French King* himſelf, and the *Marqueſs de la Fuente* Extraordinary Ambaſſador from *Spain*; And the other, what the *French Embaſſador* (the *Arch-Biſhop* of *Ambrun*) declared at *Madrid* in his Maſters name.

As to the Firſt, The ſaid Marqueſs *de la Fuente* being upon his Return to *Spain*, after the Death of the late King his maſter, and being not without apprehenſion and jealouſie, the great preparations made in *France* were intended againſt the Queen his Miſtreſs, and the King her Son, was very earneſt with his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, to give ſome new and greater Aſſurances to the Queen of *Spain*, of the reality and ſincerity of his intentions to quiet and ſettle her mind, againſt all the contrary advices, ſhe received from all parts; whereupon the moſt Chriſtian King did, with all poſſible Aſſeveration, engage his Faith and Royal Word to the ſaid Queen, that he would Religiouſly keep the Peace, and continue a faithful friendſhip both to her and her Son.

And the *Archbiſhop* of *Ambrun*, after the *French* Army was already in the Field, and had poſſeſſed *Charleroy*, ſome four or five days before the News came to *Madrid*; did *in Verbo Sacerdotis*, and upon all that is moſt ſacred amongſt the *Roman Catholicks*, proteſt and vow to the Queen, that his Maſter intended nothing leſs, than what was reported of him: *And* would never break with the King of *Spain*, or invade his Dominions as long as he was under *Age*.

But the March of the *French Army*, and the Hoſtilities they committed, agreeing ſo little with their promiſes, and the ſame being complained of; They anſwered, it was no Breach, and that they only went to take poſſeſſion of what belonged to them.

This War, or as the *French* term it, this friendly poſſeſſing themſelves of the *Spaniſh* Dominions, ended by the Treaty of *Aix*. *After* which, contrary to the Treaty it ſelf; the firſt diſmantled all

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the ſtrong Places and Holds of the Country of *Burgundy*, carried away all the Munitions out of the Country, and would have deſtroyed the rich Salt Pits of that Province, had not the powerful interpoſition both of *England* and *Holland* prevented that ſpoil.

Notwithſtanding, the ſame Treaty of *Aix*, they exacted great Contributions from the Dutchies of *Lymbourg*, and *Luxembourg*: They lay a new claim to ſome Towns, as important as any of thoſe that have been granted to them by the Peace: they have confiſcated the Eſtates of the Subjects of the King of *Spain*, that would not forſwear their Allegiance; and have not ſpared the very Royal Houſe of *Mary Mont*: Nay, as if theſe infractions were not ſufficient and ſtill to encroach as far as they were able, they forced their way with great quantities of Merchandiſe through the *Spaniſh* Territories without paying the Cuſtomes, and not long after endeavoured to ſurpriſe the Town of *Hainault*.

Thus they have deale with *Spain*, ever ſince the *Pyrenean Treaty*.

Let us ſee now how other Princes have fared with them; we'l begin with the Duke of *Lorrain*.

By the *Pyrenean Treaty*, the ſaid Duke was to be reſtored to his Dutchy of *Lorrain*, with all the places and Towns which he had poſſeſſed in the Biſhopricks of *Mentz*, *Toul*, and *Verdun*. But *France* after the execution of the other Articles of the ſaid Treaty, deferred as long as they could the performance of that part, which related to the Duke, and refuſed ſtill to return him his Countrey; till they had brought him to make another Treaty with them, whereby he was forced to part with ſeveral conſiderable places over and above what had been granted to them by the general Peace; Then after a year and an half of an unſettled poſſeſſion, during which under ſeveral unjuſt pretences, new quarrels were picked every day: They forced him with a conſiderable Army, to give them his Town of *Marſal*.

And not long after, they again compelled him to ſign a new *Treaty*, more diſadvantagious yet then the two former; ſince which he could as little as before, have a quiet enjoyment of that little they had left him. They every day encroached upon his Juriſdiction, the Limits of his Territories, and his Soveraignty it ſelf; They laid

enormious Taxes upon his Subjects: They caused him to disband his Forces, and to raise new men again as they thought fit, they kept him from revenging his own quarrels, to take part in that of others, they let loose all his Enemies against him, and stopped the Progress of his Armies, as soon as he had the least advantage: And in few words he was all that while more a Vassal to *France*, then a Soveraign. But yet all this while this would not satisfy the *French Court*: & taking it ill that his Obedience was not altogether so blind as they would have it, they ordered one of their Generals to seize his Person, and to bring him either dead or alive, as it was very near being effected. A new way of dealing with a Soveraign Prince, not known yet in these parts of the World, and which may give some hopes to *Europe* of seeing ere long, the West Governed by *Bashaws* as well as the East.

The Kingdom of *Poland* comes next, which hath lain a bleeding ever since they have had a *French Queen*, & which is at this instant in an eminent danger of being conquered by the *Turks*, through the means of the *French Cabal*, who having called into the Kingdom, the Enemy of the Christian name, meerly because they could not have a King either of *French* Blood, or of *French* interest.

The Duke of *Newburg* was not much better used, and whilst they caused him to engage the greatest part of his Estate almost beyond redemption in hopes of the *Polish Crown*, which they had promised to raise him to, by help of a strong Party they had made in that Kingdom, they underhand contrary both to their Treaties (as well with the *Elector* of *Brandenburg* as with himself) and to their reiterated promises and vows both by word of mouth, and in writing, did by their Creatures and Agents, Oppose the said Dukes pretensions, and endeavoured with all industry to have the Prince of *Conde* preferred before all his Competitors. A particular deduction whereof will (if ever published) without any other instance, be a sufficient warning to all Princes, and give them a perfect Character of the *French Court*.

The *Emperour* hath as little reason to thank them, and at the very time, the most *Christian King* sent him Forces to joyn with his Army against the *Turks*, they begun to settle a Correspondence with the *Count Strin*, *Frankipany*, *Nadasti*, and *Totzenback*, from whence their so well known Conspiracy hath since broken out, as hath appeared by the depositions and confessions of some of the Accomplices, who had been instrumental in carrying both Money and Lettes, from the *French* Minister at *Vienna* to the said Conspirators.

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Not to speak now of what arts they used to hinder his Election at first, and since that, to lessen his Authority, and disturb all *Germany* by their Intrigues and private Treaties, with several Privacies, contrary to the Treaty at *Munster*.

To which may be added, that one of the great Motives of bringing the *Turks* into *Poland* was the marriage of the *Emperors* Sister with their King.

Yet it must be owned also that the *French* seem to have repented thier pernicious Intrigues and Cabellings in that Kingdom, for when they saw the *Emperor* repairing in earnest to assist the *Dutch*, to dissuade him from that design, and to engage him (if it had been possible) not to concern himself, or take part in the Quarrel, they very fairly offered him to put into his hands, and deliver him all the Original Letters they had from all their Creatures and Friends in *Poland*. To the end both his *Imperial Majesty* and the *King* of *Poland*, his Brother might take what course they thought fit with those Rebels: A fair warning to all those that prefer *French* money before their Loyalty, and the true interest of their Country.

Nay I doubt the *Swedes*, their good Friends have not always been pleased with them: And they cannot to this day forget that some ten Years since, having made a Treaty with the *French*, whereby they were to receive, by way of Gratuity or Pension, Sixteen hundred Thousand Crowns, the *French* (upon second thoughts) finding their Treaty with *Sweden* of little use to them, refused to ratifie it, and sent them *Monsieur de Trelon*, who without more words told them in short, that the King his Master declared it to be void. A fine Court stile for one Prince to use to another! And a short Majestick way of Rescinding all Treaties.

It were both needless and tedious, to examine now how well they have observed their Treaties with *Holland*, since they cannot so much as assign the least Cause of the War they make now, and in their Declaration tell us only of a *Mauvaise satisfaction*, of their being ill pleased, which would tend to the Diminution of the glory of a most *Christian King*, unless to please himself better he put *Europe* in a Flame, and endeavour to bring all under his subjection.

But it may be thought all other princes and States, have had much cause to complain of the *French*, not to say worse, his Majesty hath been hitherto either more fortunate, or more beholding to their generosity and kindness. This must be now inquired into. I will not in-

ſit much upon the expreſſions of their kindneſs to his Majeſties Perſon whilſt he was abroad, ſince they may pretext the intereſt of their Kingdoms, and palliate their Dureſs and inhumane dealing, by a neceſſity of preſerving themſelves. But I hope no ſuch neceſſity compelled them to oppoſe his Majeſties happy Reſtauration with ſo much violence as they did, and to Cabal with his greateſt Enemies to keep him out of his Kingdoms, which his Majeſty was ſo ſenſible of, that upon his coming into *England* he commanded away the *French Embaſſadour Bordeaux*, and would not ſuffer him to come into his preſence.

Since that time they have often endeavoured to ingratiate themſelves, & have made great proteſtations. But after ſeveral propoſitions of Leagues, & many Arts uſed to raiſe Jealouſies between us & the *Hollanders* (Dreading nothing more then a durable & firm friendſhip between two Nations, who if united, might eaſily ſet what bounds they pleaſed to their ambitions) they at laſt ſided with the *Dutch*, though with no other intention, then to ſee us deſtroy one another, or at leaſt ſo far weaken and exhauſt our ſelves, that they might with leſs oppoſition invade their Neighbors, and encreaſe their Naval ſtrength, nay their policy went further, and in the very heat of the War, the ſtill kept Negotiations on foot, and made Overtures and Propoſals of Peace, by means of the late *Queen Mother*, whom in the end they deceived ſo far, as to aſſure her (and by her his Majeſty) that the *Dutch* would ſet no Fleet out (that Summer, the Peace was concluded) whilſt underhand they preſſed the ſaid *Dutch* with all the Vigour & Earneſtneſs imaginable to fit out their Ships, with a promiſe of joyning theirs to them.

Upon this Paroll of the *French* Court, 'tis too well known we had no Fleet out as well as what followed upon it, when the *Dutch* meeting with no oppoſition, entred into the River of *Chatham*; ſo that though the *French* had no other hand in't, they had been ſtill the true cauſe of that unhappy accident: But withal, it is more then probable they were themſelves the Authors of that Counſel, and moſt certain it is, they knew of the deſign before the attempt was made: As might be proved by ſeveral inſtances, if neceſſary.

After this, the Peace being concluded at *Breda*; the *French* were by the Treaty, to return us St. *Chriſtophers*, in the manner and form therein expreſſed. But inſtead of performing it according to the true meaning (and the very Letter of the Article) they have ſtill from time to time, upon ſeveral unjuſt and frivolous pretences, put off his Ma-

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jeſties Commiſſioners that went to receive it; till ſeeing a neceſſity of complying with us in ſo ſmall a matter, whileſt we were preparing to run ſo great a danger for their ſake, they delivered it at laſt to Sir *Charles Wheeler*, ſomewhat above a year ſince; But before the delivery of it, they deſtroyed all the Plantations, plundered and carried away all that was portable; laid the whole Countrey waſte, and left it in a much worſe condition, than if it had never been planted. And as if the detaining of his Majeſties Territories had not been ſufficient, they interrupted the Trade of his Subjects in thoſe parts; and aſſuming to themſelves the Soveraignty of the Seas; they would not ſuffer any Ships but their own, to ſail by, or about their *Iſlands*. And in Truth, upon no other Ground, have brought in as priſes, and confiſcated ſeveral Veſſels. Not to ſpeak now of the great diſcouragement our *French* Trade hath many years ſince lain under; through their unjuſt practiſes and manifold devices, which have been ſuch, that we do not of late ſend into *France* the fourth or fifth part of what Goods and Commodities were formerly ſent over.

This late carriage of theirs in *America*, brings us to their preſent Alliance with his Majeſty. And as the greateſt care of thoſe that have adviſed the King to this League, have been to keep from the view and from the knowledge of the World, what *Articles* are agreed upon; it is not to be expected we ſhould inſtance in the particular Breaches of what we are all Strangers to. For example, we cannot tell whether it was agreed the *French Squadron* ſhould fight, and ſo dare not aſſure they have broken their Treaty by not fighting. But I ſuppoſe there are very few, but have heard of the Wager laid by the *Spaniſh Embaſſador* in the beginning of the War; and how far the *French Conduct* agreed with his Predictions. I would not neither impeach any man upon general Reports and Rumors, but however, it is obſervable, that the greateſt number of the *Dutch* Commanders are of Opinion, and have often publickly declared, that the *French* Ships were thus kindly uſed by theirs, out of particular reſpect *De Wits* Brother had to them.

If from the Sea we come aſhore, we'l find (as far at leaſt, as they came to our knowledge) moſt of their promiſes deceitful; all the Art imaginable uſed to enſnare his Majeſty.

And laſtly, a perfect and reiterated Breach of the eſſence of their Treaty, whatever the words may be; all thoſe that have been never

ſo,

ſo little converſant at Court, may remember that one of the great Arguments uſed & ſuggeſted by the *French*, to make the conqueſt of *Holland* appear both ſafe and eaſie; was, that his now *Chriſtian Majeſty* had aſſurances from all the great Princes in *Europe*, they would no ways concern themſelves in the Quarrel. *Spain* would be glad to ſee their old Rebels Chaſtiſed. The *Emperour* had his hands full, and durſt not ſtir if he would for fear of the *Turks*. *Brandenburg* ſhould demand his Towns, and the *Northern* Crowns would either ſit ſtill, or endeavour to have a ſhare in the ſpoyl. And then this was ſo readily embraced, that even after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty betwixt *Spain* and the *United Provinces*; they would not own there was ſo much as an agreement. And for a good while we flattered our ſelves that the Leagues with the *Catholick King* and other Princes, were ſurmiſes of the *Dutch*, to raiſe their Reputation, and quiet the minds of their People. But when this was paſt denying, they came off with ſlighting Diſcourſes of the Forces of the *Dutch Allies*, and *Monſieur de Turrenne*, would cut them all to pieces, if ever their Temerity did bring them within his reach.

At the Rate the Alliance with *France* was diſcourſed of before the War broke out, ſtanders by could not but think (and I believe if Truth were inquired into, it will be found his Majeſty intended no more at firſt, and was engaged no farther) the *French* ſhould be the Principal in this War, and *England* joyn their Forces with them as *Auxiliaries*, to have in caſe of need, a ſafe and honourable Retreat in their Power. But as ſoon as the *French* thought his Majeſty could not well go back, or take new Counſels: they openly declared it was none of their Quarrel, and that they only engaged in it to aſſiſt his Majeſty, out of reſpect to his perſon. By which means his Majeſty was perſwaded and induced to declare War firſt, and to expect afterwards the aſſiſtance of the *French*.

I ſuppoſe his Majeſty will not thank them neither for giving out in all *Roman Catholick* Princes Courts, That this is a War of Religion, undertaken meerly for the propagation of the *Catholick Faith*, and as the *French* Miniſter at *Vienna*, expreſſed it in a ſolemn Speech to the *Emperors* Council, which hath bee ſince Printed in *French*, that the *Hollanders* being *Heretick*, who had forſaken their God, all good Chriſtians are bound to joyn and unite to extirpate them, and to implore Gods bleſſing upon ſo good a work. Nay, to confirm this,

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the more they have lately declared and assured many Princes, that to let *Europe* see how far they are from any such designs as have been laid to their charge; and to satisfie all the world, they entered into this War out of a Religious Zele; and for the glory of God they are ready to part with all their Conquests, and return to the *Hollanders* all the Towns they have taken from them, if they will reestablish the true Worship they have banished from their Territories.

How far now this may be agreeable to His Majesties Interest, or to the XXXIX. *Articles*, let any unprejudiced man judge.

But an undeniable proof of the uprightness of the *French Court* is, their carriage in the Negotiations of Peace with the *States*. In short the matter of Fact is thus:

The passage of the *French Army* over that branch of the *Rhine* called the *Wael*, having caused a general consternation all over the Country, and the confusion they were in being such, that they could hardly resolve whether to yield or defend themselves:

The *States* on the 11th. of *June* named several *Deputies* to be sent, some to His Majesty, and the rest to the *French King*, to know of them, both upon what terms they would be willing to agree and come to a Peace.

Those that came to His Majesty were met upon the way as far as *Graves End*, to forbid them the Court, and were carried to *Hampton Court*, there to continue in an Honourable Confinement till we could hear from the *Most Christian King*, and know of him whether the said Deputies might be admitted; his Majesty being unwilling to give the least offence to the *French*; And not thinking it either Lawful or convenient (without their participation) so much as to hear what the *Dutch* Deputies Errand was.

But the other Deputies came no sooner to the *French Court*, but two *Secretaries of State* were sent to them, and without farther delay desired to know first if they had full Power to Treat; and in the next place what the *States* could propose in order to a speedy Peace. The *Deputies* answered, they were only sent to know his Most *Christian Majesties* Pleasure, and that their Masters had thought it a greater respect to him, to receive his Proposals, then to offer any Conditions themselves. With this answer the *French Ministers* went to their Master, and came back immediately to the *Deputies*, to let them know, it was expected the *States* should make the Proposals, and that the most

Christian

Christian King, could not enter upon any Treaty, unless they had full power: Telling them withall to quicken them, and to hasten the conclusion of the work) that they were to consider, That whatever *His Most Christian Majesty* had conquered was already his own, and therefore he could no ways part with it unless they gave him an Equivalent, as well for what he might conquer farther before the conclusion of the Treaty, as for what he possessed at that time. Whereupon *Monsieur de Groot* (one of the *Deputies*) being gone to the *Hague*, he was sent back with all speed, and authorised in a very ample manner together with his Colleagues to treat and conclude a Peace with the *French*.

Upon the return of the said *de Groot* with the Powers, after some Conferences (part of them with *de Groot* alone) *Monsieur de Louvoy* (one of the Secretaries of *State*) gave the *Dutch Deputies* a project of a Treaty, or rather the pretensions of the King his Master; upon the granting of which he was both willing and ready to return to his former amity with the *States*, and conclude a firm Peace with them.

Whereupon two things are to be observed, the one that the Conditions were such, that (if granted) would have made the *French King* as perfectly Master of the Country as if he had conquered all by the Sword; and the other, that in all the *Articles* (which are still in being, and may be produced if need be) there was not the least word relating to *England*, and no more notice taken of His Majesty, or greater care of his Interest, then if he had not been concerned in the war, or in no League with the *French*. So that if by a wonderful providence of God the said Treaty had not been unexpectedly broken off, *Europe*, had in one day lost its liberty; and all we could have expected afterwards had been the favour *Polyphemus* shewed to his Guests.

And to demonstrate further, that the intention of the *French Court* was not His Majesty should be a gainer by the war, *Monsieur de Groot* (whose word, if he be not very much wronged, ought to go a great way when he speaks of the *French*) declared at his second coming to the *Hague* with the before mentioned Articles, that the *French Ministers* had answered him, The *States* his Masters might deal as they pleased with *England*, and come off as cheap as they would, because (as they pretended) they were not bound or engaged by their Treaty to procure

their

them any Advantages. A happy thing in the mean while, to be engaged in such a War, with so Generous an *Allie*.

While this negotiation was on foot, and before the Treaty could be Concluded, the *Prince* of *Orange* was miraculously restored to the dignity and Authority of his Ancestors, which having altogether Eclipsed the party that was inclined to treat with *France* upon almost any Terms, and the rest of the Country being all under Water, the *French* lost at once, both their hopes of carrying the whole matter by a Treaty, and the opportunity of making a further Progress by their Armies.

At the same time, My Lord Duke of *Buckingham*, and my Lord *Arlington*, went into *Holland*. And the *French* who knew already they could neither bring the *Dutch* to a compliance, nor Swim over to the remaining Towns. And withall, being full of Apprehensions and fear, that by the Authority of the *Prince of Orange*, and through the intereſt he was like to have in his Majesty (chiefly if their practices and honest dealings came to be discovered) a Separate peace might be made between *England* and the *United Provinces*, they Acted their part so succesfully with our Plenepotentiaries that they persuaded them to enter (in his Majesties name) into a new engagement, not to treat or conclude with the *Dutch*, any Peace or Truce without them: For as to their promising the like, it was a perfect Mockery on their part, since they had already done their utmost to Treat without *England*, and that after they had miscarried in the attempt, nothing could secure them, but his Majesties refusing to accept of what conditions the *Dutch* would be willing to grant Him.

After this new Contract made, our Plenipotentiaries together with the *French Ministers*, sent their joynt demands, and proposals to the *Dutch*, to be granted in Ten days, or else no Peace to be made, which was the next Master-piece of the *French*, for it is to be observed, first, the *French* Demands were in substance, the same as they had made at first in their negotiation with *Monsie r de Groot*, And since they were so unjust, and so Enormious that the best friends they had then amongst the *States*, could hardly swallow themselves (much less, to bring the generality to give their consent) without some Modification. It was not to be expected that the Government being since the late Change, much more averse to the *French* then before, the same proposals again, would be better entertained, which was rendred the more improbable by the addition of the *English* Demands.

Secondly, The *French*, by the excessive height of their demands, seemed to have encouraged (if not to perswade by some more effectual means) the said Plenipotentiaries not to come much short of them; which was attended with two Fatal Consequences: the one, that the War was certainly, by it, entailed upon his Majesty; And the other that it was a means to alienate the minds and affections of the *Dutch*, who were then inclined to give those advantages to *England*, which cannot rationally be expected hereafter.

Thirdly, Though the respective claimes of the two Kings had been singly tolerable, yet the joyning of them together, made it impossible for the *Dutch* to grant either. From whence the *French* (and very rationally) conceived hopes that the *Dutch* finding themselves over ballanced by the joynt power of their Enemies, and seeing no way to come out of so destructive a War, and to have peace (and not a firm nor a durable one neither) without dividing their Country into a hundred pieces, and cutting off all their Sinews, had rather cast themselves into the Arms of their Conqueror, and laying aside all thoughts of Soveraignty, live in an entire Body under the *French* Dominion. At least it were some comfort, if the *French* Court had but kept to this last agreement, which in so many respects, was advantageous to them. But that they have not done neither: And as soon as they saw most Princes in *Europe* begin to be in Earnest, and that great succors were preparing for Assistance of the *Dutch*, besides what forces were already in the Field. They underhand made new overtures of Peace, and have still to this day, been sending private Messages to the *Dutch*, wherein they take no greater care of *England* than they had done at *Utrecht*. And if the *Dutch* had not persisted in their refusal to Treat without their Allies, the *French* had long since concluded without theirs, and that upon very moderate Terms, as to the *Dutch*.

I suppose this will seem very strange, and will hardly be credited, but since as long as I am under this disguise, I cannot justifie it as fully as otherwise I might do it. All I can say at present is, there are those in the Kingdom that know the truth of it as well as my self, and I hope the world will not be long without a full discovery of it. And thus I end the first part of this discourse, which hath swelled unawares into a greater bulk then I intended at first, though the matter would bear a great deal more without being exhausted.

Let

II.

Let us now come to the *Second Head*, and examine what the iſſue of this War may prove, and what may rationally be expected it will come to.

Were it either poſſible in Nature, or ſo much as to be imagined, that *Holland* might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and depopulated, and their Inhabitants either deſtroyed or Tranſported into remote *Colonies*, or part of them brought into this Kingdom, to encreaſe the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Juſtice, or Chriſtian Charity could be forceable enough to put a ſtop to ſuch a deſign: And in the caſe it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Intereſt of *England* ſtated (as unanſwerable as his Arguments are) to perſwade men either Biaſſed, or not very well acquainted with the ſtate of Forreign Affairs, That it muſt be the chief Intereſt of *England*, to ſupport the preſent Government of *Holland*.

But ſuch a deſtruction being not to be thought on, or expected by any man that is in his Wits; and ſince the Situation of the Country, and its Commodiouſneſs for trading in many reſpects, together with the Natural and Laborious Induſtry of the Inhabitants, will ſtill continue under any change; To ſatisfy our ſelves how far we may be gainers by this War, we muſt conſider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of poſſibility.

In Order to that I conceive all men will grant one of theſe four things muſt be ſuppoſed.

Firſt, The abſolute conqueſt of the *United Provinces* by the *French*. Or,

Secondly, Our Conquering of them.

Thirdly, A Diviſion and Sharing of the Country between us and the *French*.

Fourthly, and Laſtly, The *Dutch* recovering their loſſes, and with the help of their Allies, their withſtanding both *England* and *France*. Of each of them in Order.

The abſolute Conqueſt of the *United Provinces* by the *French*, and their being brought under their ſubjection, is a thing of that dreadful conſequence, that the very thoughts of it muſt needs raiſe the blood of all

true *Engliſh men*. And there is hardly any remedy too violent for ſo deſperate a cure or means that could be called unjuſt, if neceſſary to prevent ſo great an evil, And therefore inſtead of loſing time to prove what is ſo manifeſt and ſo obvious to the meaneſt capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen, to lay the preſent ſtate of things to heart, and humbly move both Houſes to conſider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is conſiſtant with that Intereſt, with which they are intruſted, to haſten it by unſeaſonable and pernicious compliance.

Secondly, As to our Maſtering the *Low Countries*, it can be but one of theſe two ways:

Firſt, Our ſubduing of them by a Landing; and withal, beating the *French* out of what they poſſeſs already: Or,

Secondly, Their voluntary yielding to us, and ſubmitting themſelves to his Majeſty.

The firſt can hardly be ſo much as ſuppoſed or imagined by any Rational Man: For 1. If in the middeſt of their late diſtractions and the unſpeakable confuſion, which was in every part of the Country, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attempted: How can it be expected it ſhould be practicable by the next Summer, now they are all United and ſtrengthned by the aſſiſtance of their *Allies*. 2. How can it be thought poſſible to Land an Army conſiderable enough to take all their Towns, and Conquer the whole Country; Nay, to Conquer the Conquerers themſelves, and beat the *French* out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occaſion a great diſorder and conſternation in the Countrey; and that the *Dutch* ſhould not prove able to oppoſe our Landing; and at the ſame time to keep the *French* out, and defend themſelves to the Landwards, what would the conſequence of this be, but only to enable the *French* to Maſter the whole Country, whilſt the *Dutch* ſhould divide and draw off their Forces to oppoſe us? It being much eaſier for the *French* who are already in the Country, to March with all their Forces to *Amſterdam*, and to the reſt of their Towns, before we can Land; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4. Laſtly, if the *French Ships* are to have a ſhare in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Maſters; and that they ſhall not rather turn tail againſt us, if occaſion be?

And as to the voluntary yielding of the *Dutch*, and their giving themſelves up to us; I may ſay it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other: And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But becauſe ſome of our great men, have (even in Print) made uſe of this as of an Argument, both to juſtifie the War in point of prudence, and to perſuade the Nation to joyn and concur with the *Cabal* in their dark Counſels: It will be neceſſary, and we owe that reſpect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care.

When the *United Provinces* ſtill entire, and untouched, and they in an election to joyn with and ſubmit themſelves (upon terms) either to *France* or *England*, it would be no hard matter to demonſtrate and make it to appear, that the ballance of true pollicy and reaſon, ſhould weigh down by much on the *French* ſide. And that the beſt part of their Trade would ſoon, if incorporated with us, run out of their Chanels into ours; which all underſtanding men amongſt them, are ſo ſenſible of, that in Caſe this were in agitation, the intereſt of Religion (which beſides they could ſecure ſome other way) ſhould hardly carry it againſt Profit and ſelf preſervation. But not to multiply debates, and granting now that in ſuch Caſe, the *Dutch* would prefer our Domination before that of the *French*; Let us not examine what might have been if our ſupoſitions were true: But what is like to be *De facto*, and may rationally be expected as the Cauſe ſtands.

Firſt it muſt be obſerved that though their *Maratime Provinces* be far the moſt conſiderable, and thoſe which have made that Commonwealth ſo powerful and ſo famous all over the World, yet their In-Land *Provinces* are of no leſs importance to the preſervation of the whole, and are the Bull-works and Out-works of the other, without which the main Body would be ſoon ſtreightned and brought in a little time to the greateſt extremities.

For this Reaſon, the *Spaniards* never offered Peace to the *Dutch*, nor could they have accepted of it if offered, till being Maſters of Seven *Provinces*, and having withal, conquered ſeveral Towns in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, to be a fence to their own *Provinces*, their *Territories* proved of a Competent extent to Lodge and Maintain upon their *Frontiers* the greateſt Armies. And by removing the Seat of the War from their Trading *Provinces*, be ſo much the more able to continue it, rather with advantage to them, then with the leaſt inconvenience or trouble.

2. The

2. The Second thing we muſt take notice of is, that the greateſt advantage of the Situation of the *United Provinces* lyeth, in that ſeveral of the greateſt Rivers in *Europe* not onely run through their Country, but diſimbogue into the Ocean within their Precincts. This openeth them an eaſie and an advantageous Trade into moſt parts of *Germany*, the *Spaniſh Low Countries*, and ſome *Provinces* of *France*, and makes a Reciprocation of commerce, and as it were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the firſt to carry at a cheap rate to the furtheſt parts of the world, what goods and commodities the above mentioned Countries afford, and to return them by means of the ſame, the Richeſt ſpoils of the Eaſt and Weſt.

Theſe natural Advantages accroving to the Inhabitants of theſe reſpective *Provinces*, by their being all *United* under the ſame Government, do link and tie them ſo faſt together, that nothing but an external and irreſiſtable force can divide them; and who ever comes to be Maſter of the Rivers, muſt needs in a ſhort time either be beaten out of his Conqueſts, or elſe bring all the Havens, and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the ſame ſubjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers, and the Rivers without the Ports, being altogether uſeleſs, and a Foundation for an Endleſs and Deſtructive War.

This being premiſed, the Concluſion will eaſily be drawn, and ſince the *French* do already poſſeſs half of their Country, and are Maſters of their chief Rivers, if the *Dutch* come either to loſe the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Soveraign State, or elſe are brought to the neceſſity of chooſing a Maſter: It is plain they'l rather ſubmit themſelves to the *French King*, who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country, without which they cannot ſubſiſt, than by giving up the remaining part of *England* to entail a War upon them, which beſides their ſubjection to a Foreiner, as well as if they were under the *French*, will exhauſt what Treaſury they may have left, and from a Flouriſhing Eſtate bring them to perfect Beggery.

To ſumm up all: It cannot be ſuppoſed the *Dutch* will ever chuſe a Maſter, and ſubmit themſelves to the Government of a Foreign Prince, unleſs they are driven to it by an unavoidable neceſſity. This neceſſity cannot proceed but from the ſenſe they may have of their own weakneſs, and of a deſire to live in peace, and free themſelves of a War which is ſo deſtructive to them. Now if they do ſubmit themſelves

ſelves to *England*, in oppoſition to the *French*, the Peace they ſeek will be further off them, then ever, & their remaining Country will be the ſeat of an endleſs War, whereas, if they give themſelves up to the *French*, they will be United again in an intire body, enjoy reſt and peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in *Europe* is beſt able to defend them againſt all their Enemies, and whoſe intereſt will be, to give all poſſible encouragement to their Trade, and to make their Country the Nurſery of his Seamen, and in all other reſpects, the ſupport of his Naval Strength. Not to mention that if they muſt be ſlaves, firſt, they might rationally hope to have the ſatisfaction afterwards, of lending a helping hand, to bring their Neighbors, and in truth, all *Europe* to the ſame condition with them.

Thirdly, We come now to the dividing and ſharing of the Country with the *French*, which by that hath already been ſaid, will appear either impracticable, or rather hurtful than advantageous; for this ſharing muſt be either by a Conqueſt on both ſides as the *Duchies* of *Cleve* and *Juliers* were formerly, when *Prince Maurice and the Marqueſs of Spinola* entred at the ſame time into thoſe Countries with two great Armies, and took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and the other of the Duke of *Newburg*, or elſe that the *French* having Conquered and poſſeſſed all, ſhould give us part of their acquiſition.

The firſt cannot be ſuppoſed, as long as we have no Army in the Country. And in truth, can bring none able to match that of the *French*, and to Conquer as faſt as they, though they had not a foot of Ground in the *United Provinces*: But as the caſe doth now ſtand, it is plain, they would be Maſters of all before our long-Boats could come on ſhore.

And as to their giving us a ſhare after an abſolute Conqueſt, there are three things to be conſidered, 1. It is worth the inquiry, how far they are engaged by their Treaty, and what ſhare we are to have: for all appearances are very deceitful, if the *French* have promiſed to give any thing more then a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath been ſaid before, that what care their promiſes and other ſuch engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and conſtitution of the Country being ſuch that it cannot ſtand divided, without not only very great inconvenience to both parties, but the deſtruction of one of them. The *French* King, what ever he had promiſed,,

miſed, cannot be willing to give us ſuch a ſhare as would bring his own under the *Engliſh* ſubjection. And if his Majeſty ſhould have but an inconſiderable part of the Conqueſt, he could neither reap any benefit by it, nor protect it againſt the *French* power, without exhauſting both his Treaſure and his Men. Nay, it may be ſaid further, and all that know the Country will grant that, unleſs *Amſterdam* with the *Zuyder* Sea were ſpilt, and all the ſhipping divided, to have each one half of the whole, no true diviſion can be made: And whoever is Maſter of that Town, will ſoon or late divide all the reſt.

It is true, if we had ſome Sea Towns, and the *French* had nothing to do with the reſt, it might for a while be Curb to *Holland*, and procure us ſome advantage in the Trade. But if the *French* poſſeſs all the Country, what proportion can there be between the acquiſition and ours? And after the acceſſion of ſo great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagine ſome few places they ſhould give us, would be a balance to their Forces, or a ſecure Fence againſt their Ambitious and aſpiring thoughts?

To clear this further, and to demonſtrate how dangerous it is for *England* to deſtroy the balance of *Europe*, in hopes of having a ſhare in the ſpoil, and of encreaſing our Dominions. It is be conſidered that in the peruſal of our *Engliſh* Hiſtories, we find all our Forreign Conqueſts, either unfortunate in the end, or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilſt to maintain them, the Seas muſt be perpetually croſſed, for ſupplying them with Men, Money, and Neceſſaries. Nay, after the Conqueſt of the beſt part of the Kingdom of *France*, we could not defend it long againſt the remaining part, and even loſt what belonged to his Majeſties Royal Anceſtors by right of Inheritance after a quiet and uninterrupted poſſeſſion for ſome hundreds of years. Since that time, what new acquiſitions hath been made, hath likewiſe been returned either for conſiderable Summs of Money, or upon ſome other conſiderations relating to the State of *Europe* in thoſe days.

And leaſt it might be objected, That thoſe former Conqueſts were either leſs prudently to undertake, or to be kept than theſe we ſeem to go upon now: It is to be obſervable, firſt, that our Forefathers either took alone the ſaid Conqueſts, or elſe if he joyn'd with any other Prince (as when they were aſſiſted by the Houſe of *Burgundy*) they ſtill had kept to themſelves, the greateſt and moſt miſerable ſhare. Secandly, That it was ever the intereſt of ſome of the Neighboring

bouring Princes; *England* ſhould preſerve ſome part (at leaſt) of the ſaid Acquiſitions, and have ſtill a footing on the main, for the common ſafety and for the ſpeedier and eaſier relief of our Allies. And yet though theſe two Conditions met together, either the eſſential difficulty of the thing it ſelf, or our natural unaptneſs, to preſerve what we have once gotten, hath made all our *European* Conqueſts unſucceſsful, and in truth prejudicial to us.

But the Caſe being thus, what Judgement can we make, and what can we rationally expect or promiſe our ſelves of our intended joynt-conqueſt with the *French*, where thoſe conditions before-mentioned are altogether wanting? And where firſt far from Conquering our ſelves we only countenance and promote (by our ſtreigtning the *Dutch* by Sea) the Invaſion of a Country, which even whilſt it was nothing near ſo conſiderable as it now is, all *Europe* hath looked upon, not only as a fair ſtep, but as the beſt part of the way to the Univerſal Monarchy: And which did once occaſion ſo great a confederacie againſt the Houſe of *Auſtria* to wreſt thoſe Provinces out of their hands. 2. It is plain, it is not the *French Kings* Intereſt to give his Majeſty a conſiderable part of the Conqueſts, nor to let us enjoy long what he might peradventure give us at firſt, for ſome other ends of his own. And to ſecure his unknown ſhare to us. I do not ſee we have now any *Talbots* or Earls of *Bedford* at the head of our Victorious Armies to ſet up his Majeſties Standard in the Conquered Towns, and leave *Engliſh* Garriſons in them. But inſtead of that whilſt the *French* march on, and do enlarge their Empire, we pleaſe our ſelves with calling the *French* Forces our Forces: And endeavor, if not to perſwade our ſelves, at leaſt to perſwade others. All this is done for the honour and glory of the *Engliſh* Nation, for the Advancement of Trade, for the ſafety of his Majeſties Perſon, the ſupport of his Royal Authority, and the happineſs of his Kingdoms. It is true, we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have, but ſomewhat we'le have however, ſay our Great men. And we will not believe the *French King* ſhall let us go without a Reward, for the pains we take in raſing him, as much as in us lieth, to the Throne of the Univerſal Monarchy. Nay ſuppoſing the worſt (ſaith a great and noble Champion for the *French*, in a Printed Letter to Sir *Thomas Osborn*) that we ſhould be ſo ill adviſed, as to let the *French* take all and leave us nothing, yet even in that Caſe, the *French King* would rather make their ſtrength at Sea inconſi-

derable, by their being subject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Master.

I confess this is a new Demonstration in Politicks which few men would have dreamed of: and if that be all our safety, I hope no true *English* man will be swayed by the authority or quality of those who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn *England* into a *French Province*.

Fourthly, The extreme danger and fatal Consequences of some of the former suppositions, and the impracticableness of the other, being thus (& I hope clearly) demonstrated; we need not lose much time to press that increase (which is the only possible event that remaineth) the *Dutch* shall recover their losses, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with *England* and *France*. It cannot be his Majesties interest to continue a War which will miserably impoverish his Kingdoms, and by the continual losses of the *Merchants* do and are like to sustain, bring the Trade of the Nation into such a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace, Especially if *Spain* be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, as it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do.

Because I see many are apt to look upon this War through a kind of Cloud, and seem to be unwilling to have a distinct Notion of the ill Consequences with which it is attended, but reflect only in General and confusedly upon a supposed destruction of the *Dutch*, & some imaginary Advantages accrewing to us by it, which yet they cannot instance in, much less demonstrate upon any Rational Grounds: I think it necessary to add what we have said already, some few Considerations relating both to *Spain* and the *Empire*.

As to *Spain*, it is first well known that what *Crown* is to expect from *France*, as soon as these may have any opportunity of destroying them. And I suppose no body doubts but that the *Spanish Court* will by all possible means oppose the Encrease, and stop the Progress of the greatest and formidablest Enemies they have.

2. It is as plain, that in Case the *French* come to be Master of the *United Provinces*, the *Spanish Netherlands* will of Course and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithstanding the famous Triple-League which by the way will be triple no longer, when the *Dutch* Common-wealth is gone.

3. Although the Crown of *Spain* had no Dominions in the *Low-Countries*

Countries, it would be as much their interest to preserve the *United Provinces* entire. And in true Policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very last of their men to prevent if it be possible so formidable an occasion of Naval power to the *French*, after which no *Plate Fleet* or *Gallions* could ever come safe, nor consequently their Monarchy stand much Longer.

4. The *Emperor* being already engaged, and hostilities begun between him and the *French*, *Spain* can no longer stand out, and they are bound to run the same Fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the joynt interest of their Family.

5. And lastly, *Spain*, having already by their Assistance given to the *Dutch*, whereby all the considerable Towns in *Brabant*, were preserved, and by the late Attempt upon *Charleroy* so highly incensed the *French* against them, they cannot venture nothing more by an open Breach, it is much safer for them to declare whilst the hands of the *French* are full, than to be exposed to their fury after their Conquest ended. From all this it plainly followeth, that a breach between *Spain* and *France*, is not to be avoided. But the same Arguments prove likewise, that, in case we do persist in our Alliance with the *French*, they must break with us as well as with them: And since they are so far concerned in the preservation of the *Dutch*, they cannot think themselves safe if the others are destroyed.

It is their Interest by making this War as destructive to us as they can, to persuade us more effectually, than they could do hitherto into a friendship with their Allies, for to say they dare not proceed to a breach; they are afraid of us, and we know not how to order them in the *West Indies*: This were good if their *All* did not lie at stake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more than the same *All*, Whereas to the contrary by venturing *All*, they may, and will in all likelyhood, save themselves and all *Europe*.

This being Granted (as it must needs be, if truth do in the least prevail with us,) I need not use many words to make all *England* sensible of the sad consequences of a *Spanish* War; I'le hint only those that are undeniable: As *First*, the seizure of all our *Merchants* Estates, amounting in the whole to a Vast Summe. 2. The loss of our Trade with them, which of all others is the most beneficial to the Kingdom; And without which our Woollen goods must lie upon our hands, and half of our Weavers, Spinners, *&c.* go a begging.

3. The Interruption of our *Levant* and *Plantations* Trade, which cannot in case of Breach be secured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the *Spaniſh* Men of War which both as to number and ſtrength are ſufficient to cruiſe in the *Streights.*) With what either encouragement or ſafety can our Traders venture abroad; if beſides the *Dutch Capers*, the Seas come to be infeſted with *Oſtenders*, *Biſcains*, *Majorcans*, and *Minorcans?* Who are none of them inferiors to the *Eluſhingers*, and are as well skilled as they are in the Art of *Pyracie*; Nay, did not theſe very men without any help take above fifteen hundred Ships from us, in the late *Spaniſh War*, when *Spain* was at the loweſt, and fought alone againſt us and *France*. 4. By the loſs or at leaſt the interruption of our Trade, His Majeſties Cuſtomes, which is the conſiderableſt Branch of his Revenue, will come to little or nothing; ſo that to ſupport the War, new Taxes muſt be raiſed in lieu of it: And proportionably ſo much greater Subſidies granted to his Majeſty.

If from *Spain* we come to the *Empire*; we find the *Emperor* himſelf and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, already engaged in the quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, ſo that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true *Engliſhmen*, to look farther than we have done yet, and to examine with more care the conſequence of this War. For the Fire, which both we and *France* have kindled, is like to conſume all *Europe*, if we do not make haſte to quench it, and by a timely Retreat give way to ſafe Counſels. And for a cloſe to this ſecond Part of our diſcourſe, I deſire the following Conſiderations may be ſeriouſly debated and weighed.

Firſt, What horrid ſpilling of Chriſtian Blood we'll be the occaſion of, if by our wilful promoting of the Ambitious deſigns of the *French* (even ſo palpable againſt our Intereſt) we force all the reſt of *Europe* to take up Arms in their own defence, and to unite all for their Common ſafety, and for the preſervation of their Liberty, which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to deſtroy.

2. How prejudicial this War will be to us, in caſe the Confederate Princes do over-ballance the Power of *France*; And by raiſing the Reputation and the Credit of the *Dutch* (which laſt is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their *Land Armies*, but likewiſe to ſet out as great and conſiderable Fleets as ever. And I do not ſee that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; ſince

ſince firſt it is very certain, and all thoſe that know the Country will grant, That if the *Hollanders* had but ſome proſperous ſucceſs (either by their own Armies, Or by the help of their Allies) they'l be able to take up without trouble, in a very ſhort time, as much Money as they may have occaſion for. And in the ſecond place it ſeemeth pretty rational to judge that the Houſe of *Auſtria* with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will ſtruggle a while for their li.es, and may be hard enough for the *French*.

3. But how much greater will the danger be if neither *Germany* nor *Spain* are able to ſtop the Progreſs of the *French*? And in caſe they muſt all yield, and ſubmit themſelves to the Victorious *Arms* of the moſt Chriſtian King, what will become of poor *England*? muſt his Majeſty, (I ſpeak with due reſpect to his Royal and Sacred Perſon) be Tenant at will? or elſe do we preſume ſo far on our own ſtrength as to imagin we may do what the reſt of *Europe* cannot? And that though the *French* had conquered all, we ſhould not fear them the more? and could ſtill defend our ſelves againſt them? Let thoſe that have *Adviſed* his Majeſty to this War ſpeak, they muſt now pull their Vizard off, they muſt appear in their true ſhape, and tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the *French King* the Univerſal *Monarchy*, And whether to bring down new Golden ſhowers into their Laps, *England* muſt at Leaſt be made Tributary to the *French*, ſome new Hackney writers will not ſerve the turn now, And twenty ſilly ſtories againſt *Holland*, cannot make it adviſable for us, to joyn with the *French King* againſt the greateſt part of *Europe*. When this War was entred upon, no Enemies were thought on, at leaſt ſpoken of, beſides the *Dutch*. This was the only game we followed at firſt, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the *French*. But now, ſuppoſing that we had taken never ſo much care for the equal ſharing of the *United Provinces*, concerning which we refer our ſelves to what hath been ſaid before, will our Great Men aſſure us further, That the Lines are alſo fallen to us in the pleaſant places of *Europe*? And that his Majeſty is to ſhare the *Univerſal Empire* with the moſt *Chriſtian King*. I grant the *Dutch* have offended us, And that our War againſt them is not unjuſt. But is it Juſt therefore to deſtroy ſo many Princes who cannot Subſiſt without them, and who for their own preſervation are forced to Venture all to preſerve the *United Provinces*? In few words; the Scence is altered: And though our infinite Charity leads us, not to ſuſpect the ſincerity,

enemy of the *French* or fear the encreaſe of their power, moſt Princes of *Europe* are of another mind: And whatever comes of it; they are reſolved to ſtand by and protect the *Dutch*, as long as they are able to protect themſelves; ſo that to conquer *Holland*, All their Allies muſt be deſtroyed firſt: And the *French King* muſt needs be Maſter of the beſt part of *Europe* before we can have to our ſhare either the *Briel* or *Fluſhing*.

I might add ſeveral other conſiderations (And perhaps of no leſs weight than the former) to evidence the fatal conſequences of this War. But by reaſon they do relate to the ſafety and preſervation of our Laws (as well Eccleſiaſtical as Civil) I forbear leſt it ſhould be thought I go about (or intend in the leaſt) to raiſe a Jealouſie between his Majeſty and his People: leaving it wholly to the care and wiſdom of the both Houſes to provide againſt it, by thoſe means, and ways as to them ſhall ſeem meet and neceſſary, and as the Importance of the thing it ſelf requireth.

III.

So far I hope we have made good what we have ſaid in the beginning of this Diſcourſe, That this was an age of wonders, and that of thoſe wonders the greateſt was the preſent Alliance with *France*, And our proſecuting the War in ſo dangerous an Aſſociation. But ſince there are no effects ſo rare or ſo wonderful, as well in the Civil Government as in the Courſe of Nature, but have proper Agents to produce them, it is very fit to enquire into the cauſes of our Miſterious Councils, the better to judge of their true nature.

In order to that, it will not be amiſs, to look a little abroad and conſider whether the Policy of ſome other Princes, who are engaged in the ſame Alliance with the *French* may not be a leading caſe for us, And help our diſcovery at home.

Thoſe Princes are the *Biſhop* of *Munſter* and the *Elector* of *Collen*, And as to the firſt, All the world knows and we have had a ſufficient experience our ſelves how far Money will go with him. Nay he is ſo far honeſt in this, that he doth think it no ſhame to own and profeſs it openly, He is but a Tenant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true Intereſt. The Univerſal Monarchy doth not intrench upon the Sovereignty of either, his Brother or Nephews,

And

And a considerable and rich Legacie is the only Principality he can leave them; Whilst his present Subjects are destroy'd, he hoards up Treasuries for his Family. And let the worst come. Some rich Abbeys in *France* will bring him more Revenues than his *Bishopricke*, As lately a Northern King did for the like, exchange his Crown, so that the case is clear with him. And if the *States* would out-bid the *French*. His Highness would soon forget his Old Quarrels, and prove the best of their Friends.

The next is the *Elector of Collen*, who (to do him right) is a Religious and a worthy Prince, And one who in his own nature, is a great lover of peace: but how could he be perswaded then to make his Countrey the Seat of War? To give his strong holds to a Foreiner? And to expose his Subjects to all the Calamities, which the inquartering of an Insolent *Army* doth bring along with it. To this the answer is plain. The Softness of his nature, and the Easiness of his disposition, hath made him devolve upon his Chief *Ministers* the whole Government of his Dominions, and the absolute direction of his Counsels. His great Favorite (another *Bishop*) is of the same Religion and Principles with that of *Munster*, and the *Debonairy* of the Master, is no fence against the corruption of the Servant. *Quid vultis mihi dare & tradam eum vobis?* Nay, if the *Bishop* of *Straesburgh* (the said Favorite) doth stick at any hard thing and is at any time somewhat troubled in his mind, for the undoing of so many thousands of Families, and for betraying his Trust so shamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow the late *Bishop* of *Mentz* a sworn Champion for the *French*, and of whom they used to say in Jest (that he was a dear friend to them) ready to comfort them upon all occasions, and to spur him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Interest of the *Archbishop* of *Collen* lieth in this *Alliance* with *France*, And how comes it he will suffer his Countrey to be laid as waste, as if the *Turks* had over-run it? Let it not be wondred at. The *French* Pensioners will have it so, And the two Brothers *Furstenburgs* are paid for it.

The Case being thus abroad, I wish our Island might boast of the same happiness as to corrupt Councellors, which *Ireland* injoyeth, in their being free from all Venimous Creatures, And that no politick Vipers might be able to breath in our *English Air*, without soon breathing out their lives. But alas! our Chronicles do furnish us with too many instances of the contrary, And without looking any fur-

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ther back for Presidents, his Majesty himself, and this Very *Parliament* have (not many years since) sufficiently expressed how far they are of opinion, that Great *Ministers*, may betray their trust.

On the other side, because some have been guilty, they must not be all indifferently condemned, And we ought to have a great care not to pass a rash Verdict upon Persons whom his Majesty hath irradiated with so many Illustrious beams of his Princely favor. The safest way then not to wrong neither the Cabal nor the Truth, is to take a short survey of the Carriage of the chief Promoters of this War, leaving the Judgment of either their Innocencie or their Guilt to the unprejudiced *Reader*.

1. I will not insist much upon some whispers (come too lood talking of late) of the wonderful effects the *French Kings* Liberality had (almost four years since in converting the strongest opposers of his Interest, and though there be many odd passages in it which are come to the Knowledge of several considerable Members of both Houses) yet being not able my self to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the second hand, I leave the full discovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am informed upon the least encouragement, and provided he may do it with safety to his Person) will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view, and to the satisfaction of the whole world) the first steps towards our undoing, and to shew plainly when the foundation of this Mystery of Iniquity was laid.

2. But howsoever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I suppose it is not usual to see so great a familiarity (as hath been observed long since) between the Forreign *Ambassadors* and First *Ministers* of *State*, Continual treatings and frequent goings to Country Houses, there to stay several days, and weeks is a new thing in the World. And an *Ambassadors* using so Noble a House with so much freedom, gave a just cause to all observing men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am sure his Majesty himself was not very well pleased with it at first, though they have proved pretty successful, in the *Art* they have used to reconcile him to their Intrigues.

3. We have seen in the first part of this discourse, how far not only his Majesty, but his Great men likewise thought necessary to keep a true ballance between the respective Princes and States of *Europe*, and to stop the progress of the *French*. What Steps were first made in order to it, and how the *Dutch* were Courted into an *Alliance*

with

with us; joyntly to allay the Storms the disturbers of mankind had raised, and Quench their devouring flames. Nay, we made it appear the Triple League was not entred into, out of a personal kindness to the *Spaniards*, but only for self-preservation, and to prevent the over-running of Christendom. Whereupon 'tis worth the while to enquire the same parties, and desire them to inform both Houses, and the rest of the Nation, which way the Ballance of *Europe* came to be so much altered; And that hath made the *French* since the Treaty of *Aix* more formidable than before? hath the House of *Austria* had any new accession of Power? or did the Invasion of *Lorrain* weaken the *Most Christian King?* Could we value our selves four or five years since, by raising some few Banks against some few *French Waves*, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole *Ocean?* The *Jeopardy Europe* was supposed to be in was most certainly) infinitely increased. And the same *Hannibal* is now much nearer our Gates than ever he was. And yet we never thought our selves secure; whilst the Ship of *Europe* is near sinking, the *Cabal* (which is the measure of their faith) do not apprehend the least danger. Happy men, who can so suddenly be transferred into new Creatures! Who would not wish to have a share in your enlightning Graces?

But the matter of fact, by the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* all Princes in *Christendom* were invited to the garenty for the greater security and strengthning of the Agreement then made between *Spain* and *France*, Pursuant to this (as we have said before) his Majesty sent a *Minister* to the *Protestant Princes* in *Germany* to invite them to the Garenty of the said Treaty of *Aix*, or in other words, into the Triple-League. And not long after on the same Grounds, Propositals were made to several other Princes, to draw them into the same League: To which, the Duke of *Lorrain* (with some other that had promised to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought very near a conclusion, the most Christian King (who by that time was most manfully working under ground to destroy the Triple-League, and who dreaded nothing more than a faster tying of that *Gordian knot*) to prevent the Association, did very fairly invade *Lorrain*, and was near taking the Duke himself Prisoner.

In this Invasion there are three or four things that are observable.

1. Besides the scandal of such an unjust oppression, and the indignation it ought to have raised in all Princes, to see a Sovereign Prince thus hun-

ted out of his own Dominion, nothing could ever give greater insight into the Ambitious Deligns of *France*, or diſcover more fully their Intentions; none but an Univerſal Monarch can pretend to a right of diſplacing Princes, and diſpoſing both of their lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deſerve a higher reſentment, nor a more vigorous oppoſition from thoſe that had appeared ſo lately the Aſſerters of the Liberty of *Europe*. 2. This Violence was an open breach of the *Pyrenean* Treaty, and conſequently of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And ſo far the Triple *League* was concerned in it. 3. It was deſtructive to the very end and ſcope of the ſaid Treaty of *Aix*, which was to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the *French*, and to the encreaſe of their Power, the Addition of that fair Dukedome, being as conſiderable, If not more, than their Conqueſt in the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, and with all part of the *Spaniſh* Dominions, either blocked up and Beſieged by it (as *Luxemburgh*) or cut off from the reſt, and all communication taken from them, as the Country of *Burgundy*. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of *Lorrain* had expreſſed to joyn with the other Princes engaged in the Triple-*League*, was the true cauſe why he was thus perſecuted; though ſome other unjuſt and frivolous pretences were uſed.

Upon all theſe grounds, the Duke of *Lorrain* was in good hopes the Triple-*League* would protect his innocencie, and not forſake *Europe* by forſaking him. And to quicken them, he ſent ſome of his Servants to the reſpective *Courts* of the *Parties* Engaged. Whereupon our Great Men adviſed his Majeſty not to concern himſelf in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to Juſtice led him not to refuſe his aſſiſtance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and eſpecially in an occaſion wherein the Liberty as well as the Honour of *Chriſtendom* was ſo far concerned. But the Miniſters it ſeemeth, carried it againſt their Maſter, and the Duke of *Lorrains* Envoy was ſent back with a Complement, and many expreſſions of kindneſs, but told withal, the *French* Invaſion was a Torrent not to be ſtopped at that time. A Torrent not to be ſtopped at that time! And what was then the uſe of the Triple-*League*? What will become of all the fine Speeches made in its Commendation? And was it harder to oblige the *French* King to return *Lorrain*, than to force him to reſtore the *French Court*,

as

as he was by the Treaty of *Aix*; in case we had been still true to our Interest, and had been wayed by no other consideration? *Idem manens idem, semper facit idem.*

About the same time, whereas we had sent to several Princes to invite them into the *Tripple League*, the *Emperor* who might as justly have expected the same Complement, did by a Letter to his Majesty invite himself, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of *Aix* desired to be admitted into the Garanty.

Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majesty upon whose goodness some of our Great Men had not had time to work yet) assured the *Spanish Embassador* (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his *Emperial Majesty* was so ready to come into the *League*, and told him he would cause an Instrument to be prepared in order to the said Admission. But when the resolution was taken, and Orders given for preparing the said Instrument, It was first moved that Mr. Secretary *Trevor* (who was not initiated in their holy Misteries) might not have the drawing of it though it was his proper *Province*, And then having made themselves the sole Masters of the thing, a tollerable and reasonable honest draught was first brought in, but before it was perfected, they acted their part so ingeniously (with the help of *Monsier Colbert*) that in the end they possessed his Majesty with the opinion, that the admitting of the *Emperor*, would "be attended with very dangerous consequences; and that in case he "came into the *League*, his Majesty would be engaged in all his Quarrels, and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir *Thomas Osborne* expresses himself) into "the farthest part of *Germany*, as often as it should happen to be In-"vaded by the *Great Turk*. The late Secretary *Trevor*, opposed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to satisfie his Majesty, that the Garanty of the *Tripple League*, as well as of the *Treaty* of *Aix la Chapelle*, related only to the Agression and other Hostilities from either *France* or *Spain*; *Propteria* (saith the *Treaty*) by *reason of the said Alliance*. But the wary cautious men (*as well as of the greater number*) carried it, And the *Emperors* proffer was rejected.

Nay, as soon as some of our *Semi Gods*, had cut the fatal *Tripple Knot*, with the *Diamond* Sword of their *Alexander*, the poor now, but formerly vaunted *Tripple League* was trampled under foot, turned into *Ridicule* and less valued than a *Ballade*: His Majesty and

they themſelves ſince the Treaty of *Aix*, had thought it very rational and very neceſſary withal, to invite other Princes into the ſaid *League*, or in other words, into the *Garanty* of the Treaty of Aix: purſuant to the VII. Articles of the ſaid Treaty whereby all *Kings*, *States*, and *Princes*, are invited into it. But as, if they remembred neither his Majeſties ſending *Envoyes* to the Princes of *Germany*, nor the words of the Treaty it ſelf: They tell us now (in the ſame Printed Letter) *That the neceſſity of inviting all Princes into the* Tripple League, *is a Maxime much in vogue with ſome who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reaſon, you will not allow them to be infallible*: And afterwards becauſe the *Tripple League* is often mentioned, without mentioning the *Garanty* of Aix, which is in truth the thing meant by it *to ſay* (ſaith the Author) *we ſhould invite them into the* Tripple League --------*That if you mark, is ſuch a kind of Figure in diſcourſe, as commonly is called a* Bull. Fidam Veſtram, Dij imortales.

4. We have gone yet farther than all this, and the civil applications of the *French*, and their kind entreaties, did ſo prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the *Tripple League*, and hating almoſt any thing that related unto it; we ſuffered an Agent of ours, one *Marſilly*, whom we had ſent to the *Switzers* to invite them into the *Garanty* of Aix (and who was intercepted and taken Priſoner by the *French*, whilſt he was very buſie in the execution of what commands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the *Wheel* at *Paris*, although one ſingle word from us would have ſaved his life. Neither did we take it ill (ſuch is our good nature) that upon the very *Scaffold*, twenty Queſtions were put to him relating to his *Majeſties Perſon*. And (in that publick and infamous Place) a ſtrict enquiry made into the particulars of what had paſſed between him and the *King* of *England*, for thus was his Majeſty often mentioned and named.

5. But to take off ſomewhat of the wonder and ſtrangneſs of our neglecting and forſaking our *Leagued* Friends for the moſt *Chriſtian Kings* ſake, we ſoon ſhewed as much ſelf-denyal in our own concerns, and grew civiliſed to admiration, by our inward converſe with the *Monſieurs*, whereof we'll give only three Inſtances.

The firſt is that whilſt we ſtormed againſt the *Dutch*, for not promoting as far as they were bound, the coming away of ſome Families

that

that would leave *Suranam*, we found no fault with the *French*, their keeping us above four years out of Sr. *Chriſtophers*, No more than with their deſtroying, in the mean while, that part of the *Iſland* which belonged to his *Majeſties Subjects*. And we would have thought it a rudeneſs in us, to have preſſed too hard on his moſt *Chriſtian Majeſty* for a ſpeedy or punctual performance of *Articles*. Nay if the *French Commanders* in thoſe parts are to be believed, there was a very good underſtanding in relation to the ſaid *Iſland*, between ſome of our Grandees and the *French Court*, as doth appear by the Narrative my *Lord Willoughby* delivered to the *Council of Plantations*, and which is Entered in their Books.

The next is, That by any Ordinance of the *French Privy Council*, (which is now the *Statute Law* of that *Kingdom*) all their Sea and Land *Officers*, and *Commanders* in the *Iſlands* of *America* being ſtrictly enjoyned and required to ſecure their Maſter the *Soveraignty* of thoſe Seas; the ſaid *Ordinances* having been brought in by a Perſon of Quality to the *Cabinet Council*, it was at firſt to be declaimed againſt, but ſoon buried in oblivion, and put up amongſt the uſeleſs Papers though the *French* Purſuant to it, hath ſince much interrupted our *Trade*, and have proved infinitely vexatious, in ſo much (as I am credibly informed) that the preſent *Governour* of *Jamaica* hath ſent word ſince his being there) that notwithſtanding their old Quarrel with the *Spaniards*, it would be much eaſier to keep a good Correſpondence with them than with the *French* our dear *Allies*.

And for a laſt Inſtance of our more than ordinary civility to the *French*, ſeveral *Traders* in *London* have prepared a *Petition* to his Majeſty in Council, to complain of the oppreſſion their Factors and Agents lay under in *France*, with a true ſtate of their Caſe, and a ſhort account of their grievances, this came to the knowledge of ſome of our *Great Miniſters*, and they having had the peruſal of them before the delivery of it, ſtopt by their *Authority* all further proſecution of the matter and put off the ſaid *Merchants* with a promiſe they would acquaint the *French Embaſſador* with their Complaints, and ſee it ſhould be redreſſed through his means. How far they have been incouraged in their Trade ſince that promiſe, they are beſt able to judg, but however it was not fit the Nakedneſs of our dear Friends ſhould be thus expoſed to the whole view of the whole *Council Board*.

And the foregoing particulars are more than ſufficient to ſatisfie

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any impartial and understanding Reader, how far the *French* have influenced our *Counsels*, and withal they give us a great light, and help us much to discern, whether in truth we have broken the *Tripple League* (or at least let it *fall*, and *dissolve* of it self) for no other reason, but because we are constrained to fall out with the *Dutch*, and to defend our selves against their oppression, as the so often cited noble *Author* would perswade us, or else if it may not be said rather (and upon much better grounds) that because it was not the *French Kings Interest* the *Tripple League* should subsist, we have therefore resolved to break with the *Dutch*, Thus to be subservient to the ends of his most *Christian Majesty*.

But by reason this might seem somewhat harsh at first, and be looked upon as too severe a construction of our Great mens intentions, it is necessary to evidence further, how industrious the *Cabal* have been in their endeavours to make this War just (or to be thought so at least) after they had once resolved to make War.

Thus they first made a great noise of infamous *Libels*, horrid *Pictures*, *Pillars* set up, and *Medalls* coyned; to the infinite dishonour of his *Majesties* Person, and of his *Royal* Dignity, whereas to this day, none of those *Libels* or *Pictures* could be produced, And the Pillars had never any being but in the imagination of those who made it their work to raise a Jealousie between the *Two Nations*, and set *Europe* in a *Flame*. It is true, there was a *Medal* Coyned which might have been spared; but as soon as it was known in *Holland*, some exceptions was taken at it, the *Stamp* was broken in pieces, and withal, all impartial men that have seen it, could not discern any thing in it which could give so much offence, or that looked like an affront intended to his *Majesty*.

Besides this, thinking it very material to have in this, as well as in the late *War*, if not the clamour, at least the concurrence of the *Traders* they sent for several of them, and endeavoured to draw from them some complaints against the *Dutch* for the strengthening of the *Good Cause*. Wherein it is very observable, that the *Committee* of the *East India Company*, being (amongst others) desired to bring in their *Grievances*, they answered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the *Dutch* since the *Treaty* at *Breda*, (or words to that effect.) But it seemeth the Compiler of his *Majesties Declaration* was better informed, and knew more of the *Companies* concerns than their *Committee*.

But

But all this no: ſerving the turn, the difficultie, which did ariſe in the performance of the *Conditons* of the Surrender of *Surranam*, muſt be improved to the height, and even after *Secretary Trevor* had adjuſted the matter with the *States*, and had received from them the *Orders* which were agreed upon, *Baniſter's* going was retarded, and Sir *John Trevors* agreement (as if he had not faithfully diſcharged his truſt in it) ſubmitted to the cenſure of the Councel of *Plantations* where at laſt the ſaid *Baniſter* pleaded ſo well his own & *Secretary Trevor's* cauſe, that with much ado the one was cleared, and the other diſpatched away, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inſerted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voyage altogether unſucceſsful: But we muſt not forget, that, the very men who found ſo much fault with what Mr. *Secretary Trevor* had done, were themſelves ſatisfied with much leſs, before they had harkned to new *Counſels*: And were not a little Angry with *Colonel Baniſter* for deſiring more than the *States* were willing to grant. What (was it ſaid at that time) do you think we muſt make War for you? Or that We are bound to promote you whatſoever may be advantagious to your ſelf and to your Fellow *Planters*? *Quantum mutatus ab illo.*

Their next work, and and in truth *Great Maſterpiece*, was the ſending the *Yacht*, with *Orders* to ſail through the *Dutch Fleet*, and require ſtriking to his *Majeſties Flagg*. And I am ſo far from juſtifying or excuſing in the leaſt the Refuſal which the *Dutch Admiral* made to pay that reſpect was due to the *Engliſh Colours*, that the *States* themſelves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new *Engagement* for preventing the like for the future. But there are ſeveral circumſtances in it which are worthy of *Obſervation*, as, That the *Dutch Fleet* was then at an Anchor not far from their own *Coaſt*, and in a Station which by many *Geographers* accounted no part of the *Britiſh Sea*.

2. That the *Dutch* were out at that time in purſuance of the *Tripple League* and to be ready upon occaſion to relieve the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, which were threatned by the *French*, who were then in *March* with a conſiderable *Army*, and came as far as *Dunkerk*, which one would think was a very unfit time to ſend out on purpoſe to pick a *Quarrel* with them: And the rather becauſe we had promiſed the *Dutch* to ſet out a *Fleet* as well as they, to joyn with theirs, for the com-

common-safety. 3. That the *Pensionaire De Wit* who Governed *Holland* at that time with a more than *Ministerial Authority*, took a pride in standing in punctilioes in all things relating to *England*, which maketh the *Common-wealth* it self to be less guilty of any disrespect shewed, either to his Majesty, or to the Nation, through the haughtiness and private animosity of their *Minister*. And truly I must needs say, that of all the things that are laid to the said *De Wits* charge, there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a *Private* understanding between the *French* and *Him*, than his carriage in this business, and his demurring so long upon the satisfaction, which the greatest part of the *States* were willing to give to *England*, whilst he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel sought by our *Ministers*, who wanted some popular pretence to make *War*, and keep their word to the *French King*. 4. That we stayed several months before we demanded satisfaction, lest, if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too soon. 5. That when Sir *George downing* was sent over, he was bound by his Instructions not to accept of any satisfaction from the *Dutch* after a certain number of days were prescribed to him, which is a very irregular and unusual way of proceeding in *Embassies*, and much less practicable in *Holland* than any where else. It being impossible to have the *Resolutions* of their *Towns*, and afterwards of their *Provinces* without a considerable time. 6. That this was made so much the more difficult by our demanding not only the usual striking, which (though ever practised and due to *England*) was first *Nationally* agreed upon, in 1654. and confirmed by two Treaties with His *Majesty* in 1667. and 1662. But also a new kind of acknowledgment of the *Sovereignty* of the *Seas*, which is not mentioned in the said *Treaties*. So that by joyning them both in *A Memorial*, if the *Dutch* did demur upon the second and so delayed the *Granting* of the first, it was a ready way for us to clamour and possess the whole *Nation*, the *Dutch* had broken their *Treaty*, and refused to *Strike* to the *English Flagg*. 7. That after the *Dutch* had given their answer to the said Sir *George Downings Memorials*, he refused to receive it, and came away without it, against a *second Order* he had received under his *Majesties* own hand, for which also he was *Committed* to the *Tower*. But not to wrong the Genleman, we must also own, that though he had a positive and latter Command from his *Master*, which did so far rescind his Instructions, yet his friends

have

have whispered in his behalf for his Justification, that he had received at the same time Letters from some of our Great *Ministers*, who conjured him as he tendred his own good to follow his *Instructions* and keep close to them. 8. Lastly it is very observable that the *Dutch* having sent an *Express* the *Answer* Sir *George Downing* would not receive, we first replyed it was dark obscure and insufficient. Upon which they sent an *Extraordinary Embassador*, who joyntly with the *Leiger Embassador* told our *Ministers*, that his Masters intentions and desire to give his Majesty all possible satisfaction in the business of the *Flagg*, they both *Ordered* and *Impowred* him, to clear what might be obscure or dark in their *Answer*, and supply what was insufficient, and therefore desired them to instance in what they did not approve of or did think amiss, or else that they would be pleased to draw up themselves after their own *Method and way* what *Articles* they thought necessary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They Answered, the *States* with their *Ministers* knew best how to Frame and Word their own *Answers*, neither could it be expected they should draw up papers from them. Whereupon the *Dutch Embassadors* brought them a *Project* of an *Article* to be agreed upon concerning the *Flagg*, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would satisfie them. To which they gravely answered, that when they had signed and delivered it, they would tell them their mind concerning it. And the *Embassadors* refusing still to sign it, unless they knew before hand it was *Satisfactory*, their conference thus broke off, yet upon second thoughts, the *Embassadors* having resolved to sign the said Paper, and to deliver it as a venure, they demanded a *New Conference*, which was promised them, and Seven of the Clock at night appointed, on the *Sunday* after the Engagement with the *Smyrna Fleet*. But on the very same day left the *Dutch* might comply further with us then we desired, our *Grandees* did prevail with his *Majesty* to call extraordinarily a *Counsel* and to have without further delay the Declaration of War read and approved. So that when the *Embassadors* came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready signed, they were told in short they came too late.

7. I might Add as many and as considerable instances of what Arts and Policy our great Men have used to deceive his *Majesty*, And to bring him by degrees into a liking of *their* War. But this

matter being so ticklish and nice; That I fear I should not be able to go through with it (although I took never so much care) without exposing my self to the censure of the World, and having either my intension or some of my expressions misconstrued. I think it much safer, and more prudent to draw a *Curtain* over that part of the *Ministry* of the *Cabal*, and leave their *Reputation* so far untouched, since they have had the Skill to weave it (as it were) in more then one place into that of their *Master*.

8. For a farther clearing of this, and to satisfie our selves, as far as we are able, whether the Construction we do seem to make of the *Marriage* and *Designs* of the *Cabal*, be not so partial. It will not be amiss if we endeavour to discover what their own Opinion was of it at first, and how far they were perswaded themselves, their New *Counsels* were agreeable to the true *Interest* of *England*, which will best appear by the two following particulars.

The first is, Their great care of not trusting with their *Mysterious Intrigues*, persons, whose either quality or natural Courage, Honesty, or Experience, made them suspect they would be either too inquisitive, before they would joyn and concur with them, or else too resty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon these fair and honest Grounds, they reformed their *Cabinet Counsel*; and turned at once out of the *Comittee* for *Forin Affairs*, *Prince Rupert*, the Duke of *Ormond*, the *Lord Keeper*, and the late *Secretary Trevor*: This being the first Secretary of *State* that was ever kept out of a Commission of that *Importance*. Not to mention several other eminent and considerable Privy Counsellors, who till then had been Commissioners in all Negotiations and Treaties with *France*.

Now in case the *Cabal* had no *Designs* but what were for the Honour and the Safety of the *Nation*, why they should so industriously conceal it from persons that have deserved so well both from his *Majesty*, *and from the whole Kingdom*, is what passeth my poor understanding, and whoever is able to unriddle this, *Erit mihi magnus Apollo*.

But if this be no *convincing Argument*, The next I hope will be somewhat plainer; And both Houses are best able to judge, whether their sitting was so dangerous; or how faithful those *Counsellors* must be who could advise his *Majesty* to *Prorogue* so often upon the *French Kings* desire; A *Parliament* whose *Loyalty* and *Zeal* for their *Sou-*

reign, is not to be matched in no former age. We do not hear that either the *Cecils* or *Walsingham* ever advised the *Queen* their *Mistress* not to call her great Counsel, or suffer them to meet, when she preparing to assist the *Protestants* in *France*, or to *Protect* the *United Provinces* against *Philip* the Second. King *James* had no reason to fear his *Parliament*, who if they came together would not oppose the assistance of the *Palsgrave*. And his *Majesty* now Reigning, hath in the former War against the very same *Enemies* had a sufficient experience of the readiness of both *Houses*, to promote as far as they are able, any design which they conceived may tend to the honour and safety of his *Government*, and the prosperity of the *Kingdom*. Why then should our *Great men* obstruct the chearful compliance of his Majesties faithful Subjects? 3. Why not to call upon those whose *Assistance* was so necessary, and who never denied it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. *Parliaments* (I speake it with due Reverence) are now and then *Peevish* things that will not be satisfied with fair Words, and pry too far into secrets that are not come to publick view. Our *Grandees* were afraid, if so many clear-sighted men came together; some one or other would spy out the *Snake* that lay in the *Grass*, and if their *mine* had *once* taken vent, the whole Design had miscarried. No, no, we'l do better (saith the *Cabal*) we'l be wiser than to run that hazzard; we are resolved to make War, and will not be crossed in it by any *Parliamentary* Clamours. If for want of a *Parliament*, we can have no *English Subsidies*, we'l make a shift with *French Supplies*: And if that doth not serve the turn (observe the Gradation,) we'l shut up the *Exchequer*. In the mean while the *Smyrna* and *East India Fleets*, will fall into our hands: And when we have all that Treasure, who shall dare to find fauld with us?

Having brought the *Cabal* thus far, we must before we part, wait once more on some of them as far as *Holland*, and so take our leave of them.

We have already given some account in the first Part of this Discourse, of the new Agreement entred into with the *French* King, by our *Plenipotentiaries*, and demonstrated the fatal consequences of the same, what followeth will clear it farther.

The wonderful *Progress* of the *French* having surprized and righted all *Europe*. Our *Court* (who knew what slender provision was

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made for *England* in that Conquest) was little less Alarm'd than the rest: And our Grand *Ministers* were dispatched in Post-haste, both to the *Dutch* and to the *French*, their greatest fear, when they went, being lest they should come too late, and find the whole *Country* under the *French* subjection. After their *Arrival* in the *Hague*, they begun their first Complements to the *States Commissioners*, that were sent to wait upon them with all the *Expressions* imaginable, both of kindness to *Holland*, and of concernment and trouble to see the *French* so far advanced. There they received an account of *Monsieur de Groots* Negotiation, and of the great care the *French* took of his Majesty; which raised such an *Indignation* in them, that nothing would serve their turn, but destroying out of hand, or at least Mastering the *French* Fleet. And from thence removing to the Prince of *Orange* his Camp; they renewed their kind Protestations: Assured his *Highness*, That his *Majesties* intention had never been to give way to the Conquest of the *United Provinces*: The most *Christian King* himself having three times declared, he only intended to humble their *Common-wealth*, neither was it fit to suffer the *French* should go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmost to bring the *French Court* to be *Satisfied* with *Maestricht*, and the right keeping Garrisons in the Towns upon the *Rhyne*, that belong to the Electors of *Brandenburg* and *Collen*. And that in Case the *French* refused to accept of those terms, they would then take new measures with the *States*, and consider joyntly of the best ways, to prevent the destruction of their *Common-wealth*, as well as the dangerous encrease of the *French*.

With these fair promises and friendly assurances, they proceeded on their Journey to his most *Christian Majesty*, who was some few hours riding from thence; leaving behind them an infinite satisfaction in the minds of all persons, with great expectation of a *happy Change*, through their zealous interposition. But what may not the *Royal Eloquence* of a most *Christian King* do? What, will not his *Golden Word* perswade? After our Grand *Ministers* had been some few days in the *French Army*, they found they were not mistaken before, and began to have a clear apprension of things. The *Negotiation* of *De Groote*, with the particulars imparted to them at the *Hague*, was a meer slander; for the *French Court* told them. The encrease of the *French Power*, was not to be suspected or feared; they were too *gene-*

vour to abuse it. And therefore after they had left the Prince of *Orange*, three or four days without News from them, they had at last sent him word. The *States* were to give satisfaction to both *Kings* joyntly: And that neither *Crown* could or would treat Separately. This unexpected *Message* did infinitely surprise as well the Prince of *Orange* as the *States*. And his Highness (who had full power given him by the *States* to Treat and conclude with *England*) not to be held longer in suspence, answered the *Plenipotentiaries*, he desired to know what would satisfie both *Crowns*, and what their respective demands were? Whereupon they sent him the joynt *Proposals* before-mentioned, together with a Copy of the new agreement they were entred into, concerning which we'l add only to what hath already been said, these following *Queries*:

1. Whether they were sent only to promote the *French Conquest*; and if not how they could think it advisable, by making the Peace impossible to force the *Dutch* (as far as in them lay) to cast themselves into the Armes of the *French King*, and submit themselves to his *Domination*?

2. Whether they can deny they knew the joynt *Propositals* tendred to the *Dutch* should not be granted, since the *French* demands alone had been unanimously rejected, and in that case how agreeable it was to the *Interest* of *England* to make it impossible for the *Dutch* to give his *Majesty* any satisfaction.

3. Whether, they had not received as well from the *Prince* of *Orange* as from the *States Commissioners*, all possible Assurance of the infinite desire they had to see his *Majesty* return to his former *Amity* with them, and of their readiness to purchase it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If so, how faithfully the *Plenipotentiaries*, discharged their trust in neglecting those proffers, and entring into a *New Engagement*, which was so *Prejudicial* to *England* as we have made it appear?

4. How far those that were joyned in *Commission* with them did concur with them in their Judgement, and whether all those considerations, with many other, were not represented to them, and urged by some who had no other end, but to serve their *Master* faithfully?

5. Whether or no it was for that Reason, they opposed so fierce-

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by, My Lord *Viscount Hallifax* (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting joyntly with them, though *Commissionated* in as full and as ample manner as themselves.

6. Who were those (after my Lord *Hallifax* would be kept out no longer) who went privately to the *French Camp* under several pretences, and had still *Negotiations* of their *own* on foot?

7. Whether they had Order to call the *French King*, the *King of France*, and to name still before his *Masters*, as well as to set in the *first peace the French demands* before those of their *Majesty*. As all this was done in the Copies of the Agreement they had made, and of both Kings pretensions, which they sent together to the *Prince* of *Orange* by Sir *Gabriel Sylvius*: And to which we may appeal if the truth of this be doubted?

8. And Lastly, how far their Instructions will justifie their standing in the behalf of the *French*, upon a *Publick* Exercise of the *Roman Catholick Religion* in the *United Provinces*, the Churches to be divided, and the *Romish Priests* maintained out of the *Publick Revenue*? ? As is set down more at large in the second Head of the *French Demands*?

Having thus in all uprightness of heart stated as clearly as I am able the present *Grand Case of the Nation*, wherein I may truly say before *God* and his *Angels*, I have verred no one thing without *Good Vouchers* (and such respectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear, i'le end with a few *Summary Hints* of what we have discoursed at Large, and laying in all Humility both my self and these reflections, as well at his *Majesties* as his *Great Councils Fleet*, I beg of them to take into their Serious considertions.

1. *The Natural solid greatness of the* French *Monarchy.*

2. *Their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts in all ages with the consequences of the same.*

3. *The great Encreace of their power under their Present King, both by Sea and Land.*

4. *How far it was, not long since, thought fit to stop their Progress; And what stops were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on.*

5. *The carriage of the present* French *Court, and how they have dealt with most Princes of* Europe.

6. *How*

6. *How kindly they have used both his Majesty in particular, and the whole Nation.*

7. *How true they have been to their words, and to their reiterated promises and other Engagements.*

8. *How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what security we have they shall be as ready as to do more.*

9. *The necessity of keeping a true Ballance between the European Princes.*

10. *How dangerous it is to alter that Ballance, when once settled on a solid Basis.*

11. *The dreadful consequences of the Conquest of the United Provinces by the French.*

12. *The impossibility of our Conquering them.*

13. *The Impracticableness or Disproportion of the supposed sharing and Division of their Country, with the little advantage and benefit which at the best would accrew to us.*

14. *How prejudicial and hurtful, would be the contrary, any possibility and practicable sharing prove, the same being in truth no other than an absolute French Conquest in a disguise.*

15. *How destructive the present War must needs be in the end, in Case the* Dutch *shall be enabled by the assistance of their Allies, to recover what they have lost, and to come out with as considerable a Fleet as ours.*

16. *How considerable these Allies are, and how much Christian Blood will be shed by our wilful adhering to the French.*

17. *How unavoydable a Breach with* Spain *will be, in case we persist in our Alliance with France.*

18. *And how fatal the consequence of a* Spanish *War.*

19. *How much greater the danger will prove if the French be able to conquer as well* Germany *and* Spain *as the United Provinces, and that no Confederacy of* Princes, *how great and how powerful soever be a sufficient* Balance *to their Forces.*

20. *And lastly, How faithful our Ministers have discharged their Trust in these great Emergences. How free they have been from dependences upon Forin Courts. How far they have been Jealous of their reputation in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit & Reputation of the Triple League, & of their own masters with*

[illegible] Their Backwardness (not to say worse) [illegible] dressing or at least declaring against all the wrongs done by the [illegible] as well to his Majesty himself as to his Subjects. Their [illegible] endeavours and various Stratagems to engage his Majesty, and [illegible] Nation in this War, their Engrossing all business of Government, [illegible] concealing the most Important debates and resolutions from his Majesty's Privy Council. Nay their keeping it unseasonably from his great Council and putting off their Sessions lest they might cross their designs. Lastly the carriage of some of them in Holland, and of the care they took of the Interest both of England, and of the Protestant Religion.

Now I call *Heaven* and *Earth* to record this day that I have set before you *Life* and *Death*, *Blessing* and *Cursing*; Therefore *choose Life* that both you and your Seed may *Live*.

FINIS.